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Abstract 
Small Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) have increasingly been used in military 
application. The application in expanding scope of operations has pushed existing small 
UAS beyond its designed capabilities. This resulted in frequent modifications or new 
designs. A common requirement in modification or new design of small UAS is to 
operate beyond visual Line-Of-Sight (LOS) of the ground pilot. Conventional military 
development for small UAS adopts a design and built approach. Modification of small 
Remote Control (RC) aircraft, using Commercial-Off-The Shelf (COTS) equipment, 
offers a more economical alternative with the prospect of shorter development time 
compared to conventional approach. This research seeks to establish and demonstrate an 
architecture framework and design a prototype small UAS for operation beyond visual 
LOS. The aim is to achieve an effective and reliable development approach that is 
relevant to the military’s evolving requirements for small UASs. Key elements of the 
architecture include Failure Mode Effect and Criticality Analysis (FMECA), fail safe 
design for loss of control or communication, power management, interface definition, and 
configuration control to support varying onboard payloads. Flight test was conducted 
which successfully demonstrated a control handoff between local and remote Ground 
Station (GS) for beyond visual LOS operations. 
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SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE OF SMALL UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLE FOR 
FLIGHT BEYOND VISUAL LINE-OF-SIGHT 
 
 
I.  Introduction 
The Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) is increasingly used in modern military 
operations and this trend will continue to proliferate into the 21st century (Miller, 2013) 
(Gertler, 2012:1). Sophisticated UASs such as Global Hawk (RQ-4) and Reaper (MQ-9) 
are costly which discourages their use in operation where the risk of losing the platform 
is high. Stepping up to fulfill these ‘dangerous and dirty’ operations is the small and 
expendable UAS (Abatti, 2005). The small UASs are classified under Group 1 or 2 
(Small Tactical) UASs and can weigh up to 55 lbs (Department of Defense, 2013:6).  
Military systems are conventionally designed and built with strict performance 
and reliability requirements. Consequently, it is generally more expensive than 
Commercial-Off-The Shelf (COTS) system. The dollar per pound of the empty weight 
cost of an UAS is estimated at $1,500/lbs (Department of Defense, 2002:33). This is the 
cost to acquire a basic UAS that is operated by a ground pilot but has no other operational 
capability. However, this relationship between cost (empty weight) and weight is not 
linear for small UAS. Citing an example, the “Dragon Eye” weighs 3.5 lbs but the empty 
weight cost is estimated at $35,000 (Department of Defense, 2002:33) (Sam Perlo-
Freeman et al., 2014) . A similar size “Raven” that weighs 4.2 lbs has an empty weight 
cost of $56,000 (Economist, 2011). Taking the official published cost of “Dragon Eye” 
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the dollar per pound of the empty weight is $10,000/lbs. With decreasing military budget 
in the projected future (Office of Management and Budget, 2015:59), there is an impetus 
to seek a more austere approach to lower the acquisition cost of small UASs so as to 
decrease the associated monetary value of losing the UAS during operation.  
Conversion of a Remote Control (RC) aircraft models to small UAS, using COTS 
equipments, offers an economical alternative to lower acquisition cost. This approach is 
viable as small UAS with basic autonomous flying capability that cost less than $500 
have been developed (Long Di and Chen, 2011:49, 73). The desired capability of the 
UAS dictates the necessary payload which in turn determines the eventual size and cost. 
Some examples of the capabilities (non-prescriptive) to facilitate ISR operation include 
autonomous navigation, image recognition and night vision. A commonly required 
capability is to operate the small UAS beyond visual Line-Of-Sight (LOS). This extends 
the operating range of the UAS and reduces the danger of enemy attack on the GS. 
The definition of LOS is having a clear path between the Unmanned Aerial 
Vehicle (UAV) and Ground Station (GS). This will enable wireless data to be transmitted 
between two sub-systems (Gundlach, 1975: 472). The range of wireless transmission is 
dependent on numerous factors. These include power level, signal frequency and 
environmental signal noise (Gundlach, 1975: 475). The detail on the factors affecting 
transmission range will be covered in Section 2.4. 
LOS is lost when there is a blockage by terrain or when the operating distance is 
so far that the curvature of earth prevents a straight line between the UAS and GS 
(Gundlach, 1975:507). Due to the physical size, small UAS tend to be non observable 
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beyond relatively small distances without visual aiding equipment. In such instances the 
UAS is operating beyond visual LOS even though there is still a clear wireless signal 
LOS. In addition, operating a UAS designed for visual LOS beyond its intended range, 
may also possibly exceed the transmission range of the system 
This research incorporates COTS equipment on a RC aircraft. The aim is to 
establish a framework to effectively and reliably develop a small UAS architecture that 
has the capability to safely conduct operations beyond visual LOS. To ensure 
airworthiness, the operating risks of the designed architecture are identified through 
Failure Mode Effect and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) to analyze its effect on Safety of 
Flight (SOF). Corresponding mitigation such as fail safe designs and contingency 
processes are subsequently implemented to address the risk. Thereafter, the residual risks 
are re-assessed before implementation. To reduce development lead time, the UAS will 
be based on a readily available small electric RC aircraft, “SIG Rascal 110”, as the 
platform for the research. Finally, the framework to develop the system architecture will 
also encompass the regulatory requirements to operate the UAS. 
1.1 Problem Statement 
New military systems can be acquired either through COTS or developed from 
new based on requirements. Civil regulation in the United States currently restricts 
operation of the small UAS to within visual LOS. With no commercial motivation, COTS 
UASs are consequently not often developed to operate beyond visual LOS. Some 
military-developed small UASs have operating ranges that exceed visual LOS. However, 
they are generally more expensive as they have to meet stringent specifications.  
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The normal mode of system acquisition with design and build cannot fulfill the 
new operating paradigm of the small UAS requirement in term of cost and functionality. 
To overcome this shortfall, a modified mode of acquisition to develop small UAS from 
COTS equipment is studied. 
1.2 Objective 
This research aims to (1) develop the architecture of a small UAS that is capable 
of operating up to five times the visual LOS range through the use of COTS equipment, 
(2) establish a framework and document the development process so that it can be 
effectively and reliably repeated across other small UAS in AFIT research and (3) 
validate SOF of the designed architecture and seek airworthiness approval for flight 
testing. The architecture can potentially be applied to existing or new UAS research such 
as cooperative flight with multi-UASs or autonomous target recognition with the aim to 
fulfill the need for small UAS that are economical and expendable in military operations. 
1.3 Investigative Questions 
The investigative questions for this research are;  
i. What are the requirements for a framework to effectively and reliably repeat 
the capability to operate beyond visual LOS on other small UASs? 
ii. What COTS components are required in a small UAS architecture to operate 
beyond visual LOS and how is the architecture integrated and validated? 
iii. What are the hazards associated with beyond visual LOS operation and how 
can they be mitigated to achieve airworthiness approval?  
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1.4 Scope and Assumptions 
 The scope of this research is to establish and demonstrate the system architecture 
and design a prototype small UAS for the proof of concept to operate beyond visual LOS. 
This architecture will be portable to other platforms within the Group 1 or 2 UASs. A 
framework will be used to organize the development so that the process can be 
effectively and reliably repeated on other small UASs to operate beyond visual LOS. 
To reduce development lead time, a readily available “SIG Rascal 110” will be 
used as the platform to seek airworthiness approval. The SOF assessment will be based 
on the FMECA of potential risk of the architecture and its corresponding mitigations. In 
the premise of this research, there will be a clear LOS (no blockage) for wireless signal 
between the UAV and the ground pilot. However, the research will also validate the 
approach to possible exceedance of transmission range associated with beyond visual 
LOS operation. This will be simulated by reducing the level of transmission power within 
the UAV and the GS. The design will be validated through progressive test flight to 
achieve the desired distance. 
1.5 Methodology 
The first part of this research focuses on the approach to address the investigative 
question. The second part of this research proceeds to identify the system specification 
and functional requirement for a UAS to operate beyond visual LOS. The system 
architecture will subsequently be integrated through test and validation.  
The third part of the research will focus on mitigating the risks identified in the 
architecture through the use of the FMECA and establish the Bill of Material (BOM). In 
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the last part, the result from the test architecture will be analyzed and a final hazard 
assessment will be conducted before seeking acceptance of the residual risk. 
1.6 Thesis Overview 
Chapter 2 and 3 of the research cover the Literature Review and Methodology. 
The Literature Review chapter presents the background knowledge essential for this 
thesis. This includes classification of UAS, regulatory requirement for UAS operation, 
Budget Link analysis for signal transmission and the FMECA process. The chapter also 
presents related research on UAS architecture that extends operating range and/or 
improves flight control and safety. The Methodology chapter explains the approach to 
address the investigative question. It will also consolidate the requirements and processes 
to develop the system and build a framework which can be referenced for similar 
development in the future. 
The next two chapters describe how the architecture was developed and how the 
hazard analysis was conducted. Chapter 4 includes the selection of key components, 
development of the physical architecture through FMECA and a hazard analysis of the 
designed system. The chapter will conclude with a BOM of the demonstrated 
architecture. Testing and verification results will be captured and analyzed in Chapter 5. 
Chapter 6 concludes this research with proposal for potential future work based on the 
insights gained. 
  
7 
II.  Literature Review 
Chapter 2 presents the background knowledge required to complete this thesis. 
The first portion defines the classification of military UAS and the necessary regulations 
that prescribes the requirements to operate an UAS beyond visual LOS. This is followed 
by the explanation on the FMECA process and Budget Link Analysis which was 
employed to ensure airworthiness of the system architecture. The second portion of this 
chapter describes research related to UAS architecture that extends operating range 
and/or improves flight control and safety.  
2.1 Classification of Military UAS 
 The classification of the UAS is related to this research as it defines the system 
and performance specifications that set the boundary of this research. UAS are generally 
classified according to their weight and operating profile (Department of Defense, 2013; 
Ministry of Defence, 2010). However, the structure of classification and quantitative 
specification differs between different organizations. Figure 1 and Table 1 illustrates the 
UAS classification between two established Armed Forces, the United States Air Force 
(USAF) and the United Kingdom Royal Air Force (RAF) respectively. The comparison 
and application of the two classifications to define the requirements for the system design 
will be carried out in Chapter 3 of this research.  
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Figure 1. Classification of UAS by USAF (Department of Defense, 2013) 
 
Table 1. Classification of UAS by RAF (Ministry of Defence, 2010) 
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2.2 Airworthiness Requirement for UAS 
This section of the chapter covers the regulatory requirement on airworthiness for 
the conduct of flight test to validate the designed architecture.  
2.2.1 Civil Airworthiness Requirement 
The US civil regulatory requirement mandates a documented airworthiness 
approval by the Federal Aviation Authority (FAA) for an aircraft, manned and 
unmanned, to ensure that “it conforms to its type design and is in a condition for safe 
operation” (Code of Federal Regulation, 2011:14.21.1, 124).   
The approval document is in the form of an Airworthiness Certificate. However, 
the existing certification requirement in the Code of Federal Regulation (CFR), Title 14 
Chapter 21, was originally published for manned aircraft and the stringent requirements 
could not be fully complied by UAS (Maddalon et al., 2013:5). The FAA has submitted a 
proposed regulation with the aim to better integrate UAS into the National Air Space 
(Department of Transport, 2015). There is a section in the proposal that addresses the 
current deficiency in UAS certification requirements. Consequently, the research has to 
reference the proposed regulation to ensure that the system design fulfills relevant 
ensuing requirements. 
Currently, the FAA only issues Special Airworthiness Certificates for UAS 
conducting 1) Research and Development, 2) Crew Training and 3) Market Survey 
(Department of Transport, 2015: 2,4). This research is focused on the UAS architecture 
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and not the development of a specific UAS design. Hence, a special airworthiness 
certificate from the FAA is not necessary. 
To ensure airworthiness of the UAS in general, the FAA has implemented an 
interim airworthiness approval process. This interim approval process is in the form of a 
Certification of Approval (COA) and is determined by the UAS’s intended use. UAS 
operated by individuals solely for recreational purposes are termed as model aircraft and 
will comply with regulations from its community based organization (United State 
Congress, 2012:77). When the intended use deviates from recreational purpose, such as 
public or civil applications, a FAA-issued COA is required for any operation within the 
National Air Space (Department of Transport, 2014). This requirement is also extended 
to commercial purposes. 
The expected flight test to validate the system design is part of the research 
conducted under the Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT). This placed the intended 
use under civil application. Consequently, a COA from the FAA is required for the test 
flight if it is conducted in the National Air Space. However, in the scope of this research, 
the test flights will be conducted in military controlled air space. Hence, a military 
approval instead of a COA is required. 
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2.2.2 Military Airworthiness Requirement 
The Department of Defense (DoD) prescribes it airworthiness requirement in 
MIL-HDBK-516C, where it defines airworthiness as “the property of a particular air 
system configuration to safely attain, sustain, and terminate flight in accordance with the 
approved usage limits” (Department of Defense, 2008).  
The USAF acknowledges that not all of its aircraft will be able to fully comply 
with the stringent airworthiness requirements stipulated in MIL-HDBK-516C 
(Department of Air Force, 2010). For these aircrafts, airworthiness was ensured through a 
Flight Release on a case by case basis (Department of Air Force, 2011). Hence, small 
UASs would normally be operated under a Military Flight Release (MFR).  
The MFR is required for all USAF’s small UASs prior to any flight regardless if it 
is to be flown in military controlled airspace or National Air Space. As an institution, 
AFIT has an internal Technical and Safety Review Board (TRB/SRB) to accept the 
residual risks associated with the flight test of an UAS with a valid MFR (Air Force 
Institute of Technology, 2014). Formal acceptance of the residual risk is recorded through 
the AFIT Document 5028. The TRB/SRB will be convened prior to each test flight. 
In summary, to conduct a UAS test flight, regulatory approval must first be 
sought through a MFR. Thereafter, the residual risk of the system design in a flight test 
will be approved by the AFIT TRB/SRB. If the flight is conducted outside military 
controlled airspace, a COA is required. 
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2.3 Failure Mode Effect and Criticality Analysis 
FMECA is a reliability evaluation technique which examines the potential failure 
modes within a system and its equipment in order to determine the effects on equipment 
and system performance. Each potential failure mode is classified according to its impact 
on mission success and personnel/equipment safety. The FMECA is composed of two 
separate analyses, the Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) and the Critical 
Analysis (CA) (Department of Defense, 1993).  
The MIL-STD-1629 (Department of Defense, 1980) that prescribes the FMECA 
process for the DoD was rescinded in 1984. However, the procedure was generally 
carried forth and remained widely employed during the development process to ensure 
reliability of military and industry systems (Department of Defense, 1993). The 
indicative procedure in MIL-STD-1629 comprised of five major tasks. 
i. Perform FMEA to identify effect of item failure on system operation and classify 
each potential failure according to its severity. 
ii. Perform CA to rank each potential failure mode identified in the FMEA according 
to combined influence of severity classification and its probability of occurrence. 
iii. Document procedure for performing FMECA-Maintainability Analysis. This 
supplies the criteria for Maintenance Planning Analysis, Logistic Support 
Analysis and identifies maintainability design features that require corrective 
action. 
iv.  Document the procedure for performing a Damage Mode and Effects Analysis. 
This provides early criteria for survivability and vulnerability assessments. 
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v. Document the procedure for developing a FMECA plan for contractors’ 
compliance. 
A comprehensive FMECA would include all five tasks prescribed in MIL-STD-1629. 
However, the research only seeks to develop the UAS architecture and does not aim to 
produce a system to be fielded for actual operation.  Hence, the focus will only be on the 
first two tasks which analyze the potential failure modes and its impact to mission 
success.  
2.4 Link Budget Analysis 
Similar to manned aircrafts, UAS are operated in three modes, “Manual”, 
“Assisted Fly-By-Wire” (commonly known as “Stabilized”) or “Autonomous”. The key 
difference is the presence of an onboard Auto-Pilot (AP) computer in the second and 
third mode. The majority of UASs use Radio Frequency (RF) to transmit data wirelessly 
(Gundlach, 1975: 472) for all 3 modes of operation. These data include telemetry on 
(generally) health and status, payload data, and Command and Control (C2) data. Proper 
control of the UAS depends on uninterrupted RF communication between the UAV and 
GS.  
The “SIG Rascal 110” was designed for operation within visual LOS. Extending 
the range beyond visual LOS requires an analysis to verify that the RF communication 
link between the air vehicle and the GS remains uninterrupted. Link budget is the primary 
communication system analysis tool used to determine whether the communication will 
be reliable (Gundlach, 1975: 475). The signal strength measured at the receiver is 
expressed as below (Gundlach, 1975: 476). 
14 
Si = PT GT LT LP GR LR ( 𝜆4𝜋𝑅))
2 (1) 
Si = Signal Strength  
PT = Transmitter Power  
GT = Transmitter antenna gain  
LT = Transmitter loss  
Lp = Propagation loss  
GR =   Receiver antenna gain  
LR =   Receiver losses  
λ = Wavelength of carrier signal  
R = Separation distance  
 
Converting the Equation (1) for received signal strength to decibel (dB), and 
rearranging them based on separation distance, the following equation (Gundlach, 1975: 
483) is derived: 
 
          R< 100.05[EIRP – Psensitivity + Lp,Atm + Lp,Precip – 20log10(fMhz) + 20log10(0.3/4π) + GR + LR - LM ]           (2)    
R = Range (Km)  
EIRP = Effective Isotropic radiate Power  
= PT + GT + LT (dBm) (3) 
PSensitivity = Receiver sensitivity (dBm)  
Lp,Atm = Propagation loss to atmosphere absorption (dB)  
Lp,Precip = Propagation loss to precipitation absorption (dB)  
20log10(fMhz)+ 20log10( 0.3
4𝜋
 ) = Free space loss (4) 
GR(dbi) =   Receiver antenna gain (dBi)  
LR(db) =   Receiver losses (dB)  
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Lm = Link margin (dB)  
PT = Transmitter Power (dBm)  
GT = Transmitter antenna gain (dBi)  
LT = Transmitter loss (dB)  
 
The maximum range is determined by four components, 1) Transmission, 2) 
Propagation, 3) Reception and 4) Link Margin. Transmission is measured in terms of 
EIRP and is comprised of transmitted power, transmitter antenna gain, and losses within 
the transmission system. Propagation loss is attributed to the environment and 
combination of losses due to free space, atmospheric absorption and precipitation 
absorption. The reception is determined by the sensitivity of the receiver antenna, 
receiver antenna gain and losses within the receiver system. Lastly, Link Margin is 
introduced to buffer real-time variation in the signal-to-noise ratio.  
2.4.1 Electric Field Strength Conversion 
Radiated emission can be described by many means. One of the ways to describe 
radiated emission is through the electric field strength measured at some distance from 
the radiators. Understanding of the electric field strength is important as the emission 
limit in the regulation (Code of Federal Regulation, 2009; 810) is prescribed in this mean. 
Electric field strength is measured with the following equation (Ghasemi et al., 2012;40); 
 
E = √30 ∗ 𝑃
𝐷
 (5) 
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E = Electric field strength (V/m)  
P = Transmitted power (W)  
= PT * GT (6) 
D = Distance (m)  
 
2.5 Related Research 
This thesis referred to a series of research that are related to the architecture 
design of a small UAS. Beyond LOS operation of small UAS has been explored using 
means of relay nodes to maintain the RF communication link around an obstacle (Seibert 
et al., 2010). Although the aim is not the same as this research, the system architecture 
from the earlier effort can potentially be adopted to extend the range to safely operate the 
UAS beyond visual LOS.   
In the mentioned research, a second UAS was used to relay the telemetry and 
image data from the primary UAS to the GS. The relay UAS is configured slightly 
differently from the primary UAS, such that, it does not have a camera system but is 
installed with an additional modem and image data receiver. The image data receiver was 
a modified from the image data transmitter by adding a form factor receiver.  
 C2 data, including telemetry data, for the AP computer is transmitted in the 915 
MHz frequency band with 1 W power. Due to a limitation in the hardware, the relay UAS 
receives the C2 data link from the primary UAS though one modem and thereafter relays 
it from another modem that is operating in a different channel. The dual modem on the 
relay UAS was subsequently reduced to one with availability of new and more capable 
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modem hardware. The telemetry Image data is transmitted in the 2.4 GHz frequency band 
and 1 W power. It is similarly received through a receiver and relay through another 
transmitter operating in a different channel. 
Key components in the architecture include the “Virtual Cockpit” software which 
provides the user interface for the operators on the ground with the “KestrelTM autopilot” 
on board the UAV. The C2 data link is initially transmitted through the “DIGI XTend®” 
modem which was subsequently replaced by the more capable “MICROHARD” modem. 
Image data is received by the “Yellow Jacket” receiver on the ground. However, 
additional detail on the airborne transmitter was not documented. 
As a follow-on to the research in 2010, the same architecture was modified to 
incorporate autonomous cooperative control on the relay UAS (Shuck, 2013). The 
architecture was also extended from the original UAV platform, “OWL”, to a larger “SIG 
Rascal 110”. The new architecture was developed with changes to several of the key 
components. The “Yellow Jacket” receiver for image data were retained but the user 
interface software has been changed to “Mission Planner”. The onboard AP has also 
been changed to “Ardupilot Mega autopilot”. The frequency for the C2 data link 
remained in the 915MHz band using the “DIGI XBee-Pro® 900” with 50mW power. The 
Image data link was transmitted from the UAV through a 600 mW transmitter in 5.8 
GHz. 
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2.5.1 Autopilot Computer 
The general working principle of a COTS AP computer was explained in a 
research where an AP computer was designed for a small UAS (Christiansen. 2004; 
Seibert et al., 2010). The researcher explained the working principles of the AP in 
maintaining a stabilized flight towards a set coordinate way point. This mode of operation 
that does not involve active input of flight control command by the ground operators is 
called autonomous flight.  
Flight heading and profile towards set waypoints are maintained and/or corrected 
by the AP computer by controlling the motor and servos. Control signals for the servo 
and motor are generated through the Proportion-Integral-Derivative (PID) feedback 
controller function in AP computer with inputs from the various sensors and GPS signal. 
The enhanced understanding on the AP computer board helps to better identify the failure 
mode and its effect on the system architecture although the same component may not be 
employed. 
In this research, the “Pixhawk autopilot” was selected. The aforementioned AP 
computer shares the same developer as the “Ardupilot Mega autopilot” and was based on 
the firmware and software of the latter (3DR, nd).  The “Pixhawk autopilot” was selected 
as it offers more capabilities over its predecessors. These include dual power supply, 
more accurate position estimation and redundant sensors. At the same time, application 
knowledge with the “Ardupilot Mega autopilot” from earlier research can also be 
employed due to similarity of firmware and software. 
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2.5.2 Mission Planning Software 
The mission planning software provides user interface and translates mission 
plans into correct actions to be executed by the Air Vehicle. Basic mission plan are way-
points and flight profile that the Ground Operator prescribes for the Air Vehicle. 
Application and operation knowledge on “Mission Planner” has been gained through 
recent research. In particular, knowledge in integration with flight simulation software 
and “Ardupilot Mega autopilot” has facilitated Hardware in the Loop testing of flight 
under laboratory condition.  
2.5.3 RF Transceivers 
 The theoretical range of the RF C2 data link with the “MICROHARD” modem at 
1 W transmission power was calculated to approximately 4.3 km (14,000 ft) (Seibert et 
al., 2010). With the same transmission power of 1W, the “RFD 900+” modem was 
reviewed for this research. The “RFD 900+” possesses several features that were not 
available on the modems used in earlier research. These include spread spectrum 
frequency hopping, dual diversity (two antennas) and network capability between 
multiple modems. The added features may potentially be exploited to enhance the 
transmission in a given range or increase it beyond what was calculated in earlier 
research. 
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2.5.4 Long Range Flights 
The “SIG Rascal 110” has been successfully flown in an earlier AFIT research to 
develop autonomous flight (Jodeh, 2006) but was conducted within visual LOS. The 
tested system architecture of the design will form the basis in this research where it is 
reviewed and further improved through a FMECA. 
Recreational application of Small UAS has been known to transcend visual LOS 
through First Person View (FPV) operation beyond a range of 40 km (Team BlackSheep, 
2010; Montiel, 2011). The system setup for the recreational models that were discussed 
in online forums was also referenced during the development of the architecture. It is 
noteworthy to highlight that this research did study if the recreational FPV that operated 
beyond visual LOS has obtained the relevant regulatory approval.    
A key characteristic of long range FPV flights is the use of low frequencies to 
increase the range. For FPV operation at 43 km, the RC data link was communicated with 
the “EzUHF 433MHz” transceiver system at 600 mW and the Image data link was 
broadcasted in 2.4 Ghz at 500 mW (Team BlackSheep, 2010). The range of 55 km was 
achieved with the “Thomas Scherrer LRS” transceiver system which also communicates 
in 433 MHz but at a power of 500 mW. The Image data link was broadcasted at 1.3 GHz 
frequency with 1.5 W (Montiel, 2011). 
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2.6 Summary 
In this chapter, the background knowledge required to complete this thesis was 
discussed. The UAS classification which prescribes the performance and system 
specifications was presented. This was followed by an elaboration of regulatory 
requirement to test a UAS in flight. Thereafter, the FMECA process and the Link Budget 
analysis used in the research were explained. Lastly, the research on related efforts to this 
thesis revealed that previous works shared some common functionality. However, there is 
no similar work with the aim of developing the architecture of a small UAS that can 
operate beyond visual LOS using COTS components.   
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III.  Methodology 
Chapter 3 delves into the approach to answer the investigative question in the 
research. The research framework was developed through the use of System Engineering 
methods. Thereafter, the framework is employed to address the two remaining questions 
on designing the architecture and analyzing the hazards to validate the SOF of the UAS.  
3.1 Research Framework 
 A Framework is defined as “a document that describes useful methods, practices 
and procedures for developing Architecture Descriptions. …, it involves a structured tool, 
methodology, interconnections and standardization that guide what to produce and how 
to construct them” (Ford, 2014).  
The DoD System Engineering Process (SEP) is applied iteratively, adding 
additional detail and definition with each application (Department of Defense, 2015). In a 
project development, several SEPs are employed in parallel across the development for 
each subsystem and thereafter vertically throughout the development to integrate the 
subsystems. The scale of development for this research is relatively small; hence, a single 
SEP is adequate. This section of the chapter discusses how the DoD SEP was adopted to 
create a framework for the conduct of this research. The aim is to document the research 
process so that it can be reproducible in future applications. 
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Figure 2. DoD System Engineering Process (Department of Defense, 2015) 
 
Figure 3. Adaption of DoD System Engineering Process 
The process is initiated after the identification of a Need, see Figure 2. In Step 1, 
an Analysis of Requirement is conducted to define the requirements of the ‘solution’ 
system that will fulfill the identified Need. In Step 2, the defined Requirements are 
translated into functions. This is done through a Functional Analysis on what the 
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‘solution’ system needs to carry out. In Step 3, the functional architecture developed from 
the preceding level is synthesized into a physical system. Step 4 is will seek approval for 
the design and thereafter validate it though flight test. The process finally ends with the 
application of a new MFR to operate beyond visual LOS. Figure 3 maps the adaption of 
the DoD System Engineering Process to this research.  
Figure 4 illustrates the complete framework that was used for this research. 
Development on the system architecture begins after the requirements to fulfill the needs 
identified in Section 1.1 are defined. The needs are, to develop a UAS that is 1) small in 
size, 2) operates beyond visual LOS and 3) is low in cost. Objective 1 and 2 will be 
translated into requirements after the specification are defined in Chapter 4. Objective 3 
will be quantified at the end of Chapter 4 and compared against a same size UAV using 
the empty weight cost of the “Dragon Eye”.  
Specification to the requirement in terms of size and operating profile is based on 
the classification to military UAS. This will be elaborated in Chapter 4 of the research. 
The empty weight cost of the designed system will also be compared against the 
published cost of the “Dragon Eye” system to establish the relative affordability in the 
event that the system is lost in an operation. 
The remaining investigative questions of this research are associated with the 
architecture and air worthiness validation of the system. In the development framework 
for this research, these correspond to the three elements in the Functional Analysis and 
Allocation level. Hence, emphasis was placed on the details of the three elements in that 
level and is documented in the following section of this chapter.     
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Figure 4: Development Framework for UAS to Operate Beyond Visual LOS 
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3.2 System Architecture Development 
 Architecture is defined as “fundamental concepts or properties of a system in its 
environment embodied in its elements, relationships, and in the principles of its design 
and evolution” (ISO/IEC/IEEE, nd). Documenting the architecture of the designed 
system as part of the research framework will facilitate future application or 
modification. 
Development on the system architecture begins after the requirements to fulfill 
the identified needs have been defined. These requirements are then translated into 
functions and allocated to the three major sub-systems of the UAS. The allocated 
functions are subsequently decomposed until it can be performed by a physical 
component. Thereafter, testing and evaluation are carried out to ensure the multitude of 
components is properly integrated. 
An earlier research effort in AFIT has successfully developed, and autonomously 
flown a “SIG Rascal 110” UAV (Jodeh, 2006). Figure 5 shows the system architecture 
developed in the previous research effort. However, it is observed that the documented 
architecture focused only on the communication linkage and was incomplete as a system 
with key components such as the motor not being included in the diagram. Available fail-
safes are also not documented in the architecture definition. Hence, a new architecture 
has to be designed for this research. 
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Figure 5. Communication Architecture of Autonomous “SIG Rascal 110” (Jodeh, 2006) 
The functional requirements of the system are allocated to sub-systems in the 
designed architecture and progressively decomposed until a physical component can be 
assigned. This research aims to develop a comprehensive architecture that encapsulates 
all the components in the design. In addition, it will also document the relationship 
between the components by indentifying all the information and resource flowing 
between the component interfaces. Tests will be conducted to verify component 
capabilities that are critical in fulfilling the defined requirements. One such example is 
the verification to ensure that the system can operate in an increased range that is beyond 
visual LOS. 
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3.3 Risk Management 
 Risk is the potential for a negative future reality that may or may not happen. It is 
defined by the probability of occurrence and the consequences of occurrence 
(Department of Defense, 2001: 133). Risk management is the organized method to 
identify and measure, thereafter to handle the risk. (Department of Defense, 2001: 134). 
Similar to the system architecture, documenting the risk management process as part of 
the research framework will facilitate future application or modification. 
Past UAS research efforts in AFIT were focused on the technical development of 
new capabilities and did not conduct a FMECA for the risk analysis on their systems 
(Jodeh, 2006; Seibert et al., 2010; Shuck, 2013). In addition, operating beyond visual 
LOS has considerations that may not be applicable in normal visual LOS operation. The 
architecture shown in Figure 5 has a dual redundancy on the wireless control input to the 
aircraft. However, it is evident that the relay switch will be the single point of failure to 
all the servos in the system. The consequence associated with the relay switch failure has 
to be analyzed to determine if it is acceptable when the aircraft is operated beyond visual 
LOS. 
  The recursive risk management approach carried out in this research to ensure 
airworthiness of the system is shown in figure 4. The potential hazards of the system 
architecture are evaluated through the use of FMECA where the outcome of possible 
failure mode of each component is analyzed. Mitigations through design improvement 
and contingency procedures were subsequently put in place to reduce the probability or 
consequence of occurrence. With the design improvement and procedural mitigations in 
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place, a final risk assessment is conducted to assess if the residual risk is within 
acceptable level.  
3.4 Incremental Flight Testing  
 As part of the risk management approach, key functions of the designed system 
are individually validated through flight testing. This is carried out using the existing 
MFR to operate a “SIG Rascal 110” UAS within LOS. After finalizing the design, an 
initial flight test will be carried out to test the key features. Thereafter, progressive testing 
will be designed to gradually increase the range of the flight test until it achieves the 
requirement to operate beyond visual LOS. The latter flight tests will not be carried out 
due to constraints on the research duration. 
3.5 Design Approval 
 Following the final risk assessment, the system architecture will be compiled with 
the operating procedures as a part of the Safety Plan which will be reviewed by AFIT’s 
TRB/SRB for approval. Following AFIT’s endorsement, the designed system will be 
submitted for COA and MFR approval.  
3.6 Summary 
This chapter described the framework that will be used to develop a small UAS 
that can be operated beyond visual LOS. A risk analysis will be conducted on the system 
architecture before it is submitted, together with the operating procedures, for approval. 
The documented framework and system architecture can be applied to facilitate efficient 
reproducibility of this development for future research.     
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IV.  System Architecture and Risk Management 
Following the processes illustrated in Figure 4, Chapter 4 begins by defining the 
specification that determines the requirements for the system architecture. This is 
followed by the development of the system architecture together with the risk 
management process to ensure airworthiness  
4.1 Specification of Requirements 
The specification of the requirements in terms of weight and operating profile 
used in the research were referenced to existing UAS classification in USAF and RAF. 
Adaptations were made to customize the specification from the two classifications. 
4.1.1 Weight Requirement 
 Table 2 summarizes the difference in the weight classification of the UAS 
between the USAF and RAF that was previously illustrated in Figure 1 and Table 1 
respectively.  
Table 2. Classification of UAS Weight in USAF and RAF 
Weight [lbs] USAF RAF 
< 4.4 Group 1 Micro/Mini 
Class I 
Micro 
< 20 Mini < 44 Group 2 Small Tactical < 55 Small < 330 Group 3 Tactical < 1,320 Class II Tactical 
> 1320 
Group 4 Persistent 
Class III 
Medium Altitude Long 
Endurance 
Group 5 Penetrating 
High Altitude Long 
Endurance 
Strike/Combat 
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The size of a UAS is associated with its weight in both the USAF and RAF 
classifications. However, there are notable differences between the two classifications for 
UAS that weigh below 330 lbs. The USAF classification of a ‘small’ (tactical) UAS 
weighs less than 55 lbs while the classification of ‘small’ UAS in RAF can weigh up to 
330 lbs (150 kg).  
This research aims to develop a small UAS that can be operated beyond visual 
LOS, but at the same time, is inexpensive so that it is expendable in an operation. Hence, 
the comparatively lower weight limit, and its corresponding cost, of the ‘small’ UAS in 
the USAF’s classification make it more appropriate for the scope of this research. The 
maximum weight of the USAF’s Group 2 Small Tactical UAS is 55 lbs with an estimated 
empty weight cost up to $550,000. However, the Group 2 Small Tactical UAS in the 
USAF classification does not adequately differentiate the limit at the lower end of the 
weight range. The lower weight limit of Group 2 small UAS at 21 lbs is relatively high. 
Consequently, the minimum weight of 4.4 lbs from the RAF Class I Mini UAS 
classification was integrated to the USAF Group 2 UAS in the weight specification for 
this research. This adaptation also recognizes the need of micro technology that is 
required for miniature UAS which separates its development from the small UAS.  
In summary, the applicable weight range for this architecture is between 4.4 to 55 
lbs. This weight range is also consistent with the FAA’s definition of small UAS 
(Department of Transport, 2015). The empty weight of “SIG Rascal 110” is 11 lbs and is 
appropriate to serve as the base platform in this research.  
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4.1.2 Operating Profile Requirement 
 The UAS classification in the USAF and RAF was previously illustrated in Figure 
1 and Table 1 respectively. Table 3 and Table 4 summarized the difference in altitude and 
operating range of the established Air Forces.  
 
Table 3. Classification of UAS Operating Altitude in USAF and RAF 
Altitude [ft] USAF RAF 
< 200 Group 1 Micro/Mini 
Class I 
Micro 
< 1,200 Mini < 3,000 Group 2 Small Tactical < 3,500 Small < 5,000 
Group 3 & 4 Tactical/ Persistent < 10,000 Class II Tactical < 18,000 
Class III 
Medium altitude Long Endurance < 45,000 
Group 5 Penetrating < 65,000 High altitude Long Endurance Strike/Combat 
 
Table 4. Classification of UAS Operating Range in RAF 
Range [km] RAF 
5 km (16,400 ft) LOS1 
Class I 
Micro 
25 km (82,000 ft) LOS Mini 
50 km (164,000 ft) LOS Small 
200 km (656,000 ft) LOS Class II Tactical 
Unlimited Beyond LOS 
Class III 
Medium Altitude Long Endurance 
Unlimited Beyond LOS High Altitude Long Endurance 
Unlimited  Beyond LOS Strike/Combat 
 
From the two tables, it is observed that the operating profile is directly related to 
the weight of the UAS. From Table 3, the maximum operating altitude, for the identified 
USAF Group 2 UAS is 3,500 ft above sea level. However, the operating range for the 
                                                 
1 The definition of LOS in the RAF classification is RF LOS and not visual LOS. 
33 
USAF UAS classification was not published. The operating range is published in the 
RAF classification, but it is referenced to RF LOS and not visual LOS. Hence, it cannot 
be adopted directly.  
From previous research, the “SIG Rascal 110” can be safely operated in “Manual 
mode” at a distance of 1,000 ft (≈ 305 m) at an altitude of 200 ft without visual aid. 
Visual LOS can be maintained up to a distance of 2,000 ft (≈ 610 m) when operating in 
“Autonomous mode”. The “SIG Rascal 110” weighs 11 lbs and has a wing span of 9.2 ft 
(SIG Rascal Specification, nd). Depending on size, the distance is increased if a larger 
UAV is employed.  For this research, the target was set to extend the range, to five times 
that of visual LOS, up to 10,000 ft (≈ 3,050 m). A safety factor of 30 % was further 
added into the target which brings the range to 13,000 ft (≈ 4 km). 
4.2 System Architecture Development 
In this section, the functional requirements of the system are identified and 
allocated to various sub-systems of the architecture to be designed. Thereafter, the 
functional allocation is progressively broken down until physical components can be 
assigned to fulfill requirements. 
4.2.1 Identifying and Allocating System Functional Requirements 
A typical UAS setup (Shuck, 2013:32; Diamond et al., 2009:66; Seibert et al., 
2010:38) was adopted for the research. This setup includes an Air Vehicle, a Ground 
Station and Ground Operators. See Figure 6 for typical setup. 
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Figure 6: Allocation of System Functional Requirements 
In the setup, Ground Operators will conduct mission planning and upload the 
mission plans into the GS. Thereafter, they will control the UAS from the GS. In 
addition, the Ground Operators will also be responsible for executing established 
operating procedures in the event of a contingency.  
The GS receives mission plans, processes them into command signals and 
transmits it to the Air Vehicle. Simultaneously, it receives telemetry data from the Air 
Vehicle, processes and displays them to the Ground Operators. This data is also stored for 
future reference. The functional allocation for the GS is decomposed in the Figure 7.   
 
 
Figure 7: Allocation of System Function for GS 
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The Air Vehicle will carry the mission payload and fly towards the designated 
waypoints while monitoring essential onboard data. It transmits telemetry and image data 
to the GS for monitoring while simultaneously receiving command signals from the GS. 
Lastly, the Air Vehicle must be capable of receiving GPS signal to establish the system’s 
geographic location. The decomposed functional allocation for the Air Vehicle is 
illustrated in Figure 8  
 
 
Figure 8: Allocation of System Function for Air Vehicle 
4.2.2 Assigning Components to Allocated Function 
 COTS components were assigned to fulfill the decomposed functions for the 
subsystems in Figure 7 and Figure 8. See following table for assignment of components 
to decomposed functional requirement. Key components are evaluated in the next section 
to ensure that the assigned components can fulfill the allocated functional requirement. 
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Table 5. Component Assignment for Allocated Functions 
Sub System Functional Requirement Component Assigned 
GS 
2.1 Receive Mission Plan Laptop 
2.2 2.2.1 Receive Image Data RF Transceiver 2.2.2 Receive Telemetry Data RF Transceiver 
2.3 2.3.1 Transmit Command Data RF Transceiver 2.3.2 Update Mission Plan RF Transceiver 
2.4 Process Data Mission Planning Software 
2.5 Display Data Laptop 
2.6 Store Data Laptop 
2.7 Provide Power Lithium Battery 
Air 
Vehicle 
3.1 
3.1.1 Generate Thrust Motor + Propeller 
3.1.2 
3.1.2.1 Control Speed Electronic Speed Controller 
3.1.2.1 Control Heading Servos to Flight Control Surface 
3.1.2.1 Control Altitude Servos to Flight Control Surface 
3.1.3  Navigate to Way Points AP Computer 
3.2 
3.2.1 3.2.1.1 Transmit Image Data RF Transceiver 3.2.1.2 Transmit Telemetry Data RF Transceiver 
3.2.2 
3.2.2.1 Receive Command Data RF Transceiver 
3.2.2.2 Receive Mission Plan Updates 
RF Transceiver 
3.3 
3.3.1 Monitor Power Status AP Computer 
3.3.2 Monitor GS Comms Link AP Computer 
3.3.3 Receive GPS Data AP Computer 
3.3.4 Monitor Flight Parameter AP Computer 
3.4 
3.4.1 Measure Heading Magnetic Compass 
3.4.2 Measure Air Speed Pitot-Static Sensor 
3.4.3 Measure Altitude GPS 
3.5 Capture Image Camera System 
3.6 Provide Power Lithium Polymer Battery 
3.7 Establish Geo Location GPS 
 
4.2.3 Evaluation of Components 
Key components for the functional allocation are 1) Mission Planning Software, 
2) RF Transceiver, and 3) AP Computer. The mission planning software and AP 
computer influence the overall system capability while the RF transceiver determines the 
operating range. Evaluation was conducted on these three components to ensure that the 
designed system meets the specified requirement in terms of range and SOF. 
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COTS RC aircraft can be procured at different stages of assembly, ranging from 
bare fuselage to Ready-to-Fly kit. With a bare fuselage kit, the suppliers would readily 
recommend the minimum specifications for the basic components on the air vehicle. 
These recommendations include sizing of the servos (torque requirement), motor (power 
requirement) and propeller (pitch and diameter requirement). For Ready-to-Fly kit these 
basic components are packaged with the fuselage. In this research, the basic components 
were selected based on previously flown “SIG Rascal 110” in earlier AFIT research. 
Consequently, evaluation of these three components was not required.  
Battery size is related to voltage and amperage capacity. The required battery size 
is dependent, in part, on the voltage requirement of the motor and intended duration of 
the system. This research will only ensure that the selected battery can supply the 
required voltage to safely drive the motor. Specific amperage capacity of the battery is 
not established as operating duration may change as different missions require. This will 
be determined separately after the mission is defined. The research will instead measure 
the rate of amperage utilization to provide a baseline to scale the battery capacity 
according to the desired duration for future application. This will be documented in 
Chapter 5.  
GPS, magnetic compass and the pitot-static sensor have singular functions unlike 
the mission planning software and AP computer. In addition, differences in specifications 
for these components will only affect the accuracy in the geo-location, air speed and 
altitude of the air vehicle which do not have a direct impact on the capability, unlike the 
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RF transceiver. Hence, compatible pitot-static sensor and GPS with integrated magnetic 
compass are taken from COTS selection without detailed evaluation. 
Mission Planning Software 
Central to the GS is the software that can translate mission plans into correct 
actions to be executed by the Air Vehicle. Basic mission plans consists of way-points and 
flight profiles that the Ground Operators prescribe for the Air Vehicle. Several models of 
COTS software are available in the market that can fulfill this function. Earlier research 
conducted in AFIT achieved autonomous UAS flight by employing either “Mission 
Planner” (Shuck, 2013:26; Seibert et al., 2010:164) or “Virtual Cockpit” (Diamond et al., 
2009:66).  
“Mission Planner” will be adopted for this research as it is used in more recent 
research and more importantly, it is compatible with “Pixhawk autopilot”. Care was 
taken when interfacing the selected software and hardware. “Mission Planner” is only 
compatible with Windows Operating System. Hence, the accompanying laptop in the GS 
must be running on the Windows Operating System. In addition, configuration 
management should also be maintained for the software versioning of “Mission Planner” 
as a new version may not be fully backward compatible with the flight firmware in the 
autopilot computer. 
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RF Transceiver 
Wireless transmission is achieved by modulating the data onto a high frequency 
carrier signal. A transceiver system is comprised of a modem and an antenna which 
transmits and receives modulated signals at the same time. 
Based on the Link Budget Analysis in Section 2.4, transceiver frequency and 
power output are two of the factors that determine the transmission range. The spectrum 
usage for radio frequency is regulated and differs between countries. Considerations have 
to be taken in selecting the legal frequency spectrum that will be used for various 
functions on the UAS. In the USA, RF spectrum usage is regulated by the National 
Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA). Prior to selection, the 
frequency of the intended transceiver should be verified against the Code of Federal 
Regulation for restrictions (Code of Federal Regulation, 2009: 808) and Spectrum 
Allocation Chart by NTIA (National Telecommunications and Information 
Administration, 2011) for possible interference. 
Apart from frequency usage, the transmission power is also regulated to reduce 
interfaces to users of the electromagnetic spectrum (Code of Federal Regulation, 2009: 
810). The following table shows the regulated limits to the transmission power at various 
frequencies.  
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Table 6: Limits of Transmission Power at Various Frequencies (CFR, 2009: 810) 
Frequency (MHz) Field Strength (μV/m) Measurement Distance (m) 
0.009 – 0.49 2,400/F (kHz) 300 
0.49 – 1.705 2,400/F (kHz) 30 
1.705 – 30 30 30 
30 – 88 100 3 
88 – 216 150 3 
216 – 960 200 3 
Above 960 500 3 
Using Equation (5), the corresponding limit to transmission power at 216 to 960 
MHz is 12 mW and above 960 MHz is 75 mW. Beyond the regulated limit, additional 
provisions apply to the transmission device. The Table 7 is an abstract of the additional 
provisions that are applicable to the various frequencies mentioned in this thesis (Code of 
Federal Regulation, 2009). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
41 
 
Table 7: Additional Provision on Transmitting Device Beyond Regulated Power Limit  
Frequency Power Remarks 
410 – 470 
(MHz) 
30 + 6 
(dB) 
-For intermittent control signals, maximum transmitter power is 
30 dBm with antenna gain of 6 dBi. 
-For continuous transmission, maximum transmission power is 
12 mW. 
902 – 928 
(MHz) 
1,000 
(mW) 
-Applicable to spread spectrum transmitter with minimum of 50 
channel hopping capability and digitally modulated transmitter. 
-Maximum transmission power is reduced to 250 mW if channel 
hopping is between than 49 to 25 channels. 
1.24 – 1.3 
(GHz) 
40 + 6 
(dB) 
-For intermittent control signals, maximum transmitter power is 
40 dBm with antenna gain of 6 dBi. 
-For continuous transmission, maximum transmission power is 
75 mW. 
2.4 – 2.435 
(GHz) 
1,000 
(mW) 
-Applicable to spread spectrum transmitter with minimum of 75 
channel hopping capability and digitally modulated transmitter. 
-Maximum transmission power is reduced to 125 mW if channel 
hopping is less than 75 channels. 
-At maximum transmission power, use of directional antenna is 
permitted with power reduction. For every 3dBi gain in antenna, 
transmission power must be reduced by 1 dB.  
5.725 – 
5.85 (GHz) 
1,000 
(mW) 
-Applicable to spread spectrum transmitter and digital 
modulation. 
 
The functional decomposition has identified three categories of data to be 
transmitted or received; Image, Command and Telemetry. The Command and Telemetry 
data are commonly categorized together as the Command and Control (C2) data link. 
This link generally requires lower data transmission rate in the range of 50-200 kbps 
(Gundlach, 1975:500). Image data on the other hand requires a much higher data 
transmission rate ranging from 250-450 kbps (Riiser et al., 2012:24,9). Although the C2 
data link is less demanding, it is more critical compared to the image data link. To avoid 
RF interference, the two data links are separated using different frequency spectrums. 
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From Nyquist’s theory, the rate of data transmission is dependent on the available 
bandwidth which the RF signals are broadcast in. Higher data rate requires larger 
bandwidth. From Section 2.5, three ranges of transmission frequency were used in earlier 
research. They were, 915 MHz, 2.4 GHz and 5.8 GHz. The 915 MHz band has 
consistently been used for the C2 data link in earlier research and will similarly be 
adopted for this thesis. The allowable bandwidth for spread spectrum transmission in the 
2.4 GHz frequency range is 83.5 MHz Federal (Federal Communications Commission, 
1996: 20-21). For the 5.8 GHz frequency range, the allowable bandwidth is 125 MHz. 
Hence, for possible higher data rate, the 5.8 GHz was selected for Image data link 
(Federal Communications Commission, 1996: 22-23).  
From Section 2.5.4, model aircraft that have achieved a range of 40 km operated 
in lower RF frequency for the C2 data link at 433 MHz. However, it is not necessary to 
adopt the same frequency as the maximum expected range of the research is not as far. 
Earlier research has already shown that a 915 MHz modem at 1 W transmission power is 
capable of reaching 4.3 km (14,000 ft) (Seibert et al., 2010).   
For the preliminary architecture, the “RFD900+” transceiver and a set of 
“Aomway 5.8 GHz” transmitter and receiver were identified for the C2 and image data 
link, respectively. The former operates at a mean frequency of 915 Mhz bandwidth with a 
transmission power of 1,000 mW (RFD 900, nd). The latter operates at a mean frequency 
of 5.8 Ghz with a transmission power of 1,000 mW (Aomway, nd). Operating range of 
the transceiver/transmitter was estimated through theoretical analysis with Equation (2) 
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for the Link Budget Analysis and is shown in Table 8. The system’s gains, losses and 
sensitivity in the table were estimated (Jacques et al., 2015).   
  
          R< 100.05[EIRP – Psensitivity + Lp,Atm + Lp,Precip – 20log10(fMhz) + 20log10(0.3/4π) + GR + LR - LM ]           (2)    
  
Table 8. Theoretical Range for C2 and Image Data Link 
 
C2 Data Image Data 
RFD 900+ 
(1,000 mW / 915 Mhz) 
Aomway 5.8 GHz 
(1,000 mW / 5.8 Ghz) 
ERIP 
Ptx [dBm] 30 30 
Gtx [dBi] 2.5 
Ltx [dB] -1 
Psensitivity [dBm] (-) -115 
Lp,Atm [dB] and Lp,Precip [dB] -5 
20log10 (fMhz) (-) 59.08 (-) 75.27 
20log10 (
0.3
4𝜋
) -32.44 
GR [dBi] 2.5 
LR [dB] -1.5 
LM [dB] -20 
Total [dB] 30.98 11.39 
Range 
[km] 
Theoretical 35.4 3.7 
Rated 40 Not rated 
Required 4 
 
 
The “RFD900+” transceiver was selected as it provides two features that were 
useful for the architecture. Firstly, it supports dual diversity antenna which reduces 
chances of RF communication breakdown when the receiver and transmitter antenna are 
pointing directly at each other. Secondly, it also has a network capability that allows 
multiple transceivers to communicate at the same time. This capability may be helpful for 
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future development on cooperative control of multiple UAVs. Both features will be 
discussed in Section 4.2.4 
In general, transmission rate of wireless data depends on the type of transmission 
techniques and the maximum transmission power. When data packets are lost due to 
interference or excessive distance, the data transmission rate is reduced to facilitate repeat 
sending of the lost data packages. Loss of a data package can be reduced with increased 
transmission power (Roberts, 2012; 160). The “RFD900+” transmits at a data rate of 250 
kbps. At 40 km, the rated air data rate reduces to 64 kbps (RFD 900, nd). Verification 
may be required to ensure that the data rate is adequate to support reliable RF 
communication. 
For the Image data link, the theoretical distance with a 20 dB link margin is 
slightly less than the required range. However, this may be acceptable as the Image data 
link does not have a direct impact on the SOF. Analysis will be carried out in a later 
section of the chapter to analyze the adequacy of the selected component.  
 Onboard Autopilot Computer 
 Autonomous flight is facilitated out by the AP computer. It controls the motor and 
servos to maintain and/or correct flight heading and profile towards set waypoints. The 
servo and motor control signals are generated through the Proportion-Integral-Derivative 
(PID) feedback controller function in the AP computer (Beard et al., 2012:95) with inputs 
from the various sensors and GPS signal. In addition, the AP computer also provides 
programmable built-in fail-safe logic to enhance SOF. 
An aircraft’s flight is characterized by twelve state variable equations of motion 
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(Beard et al., 2012). To maintain stabilized flight, an AP computer is required to process 
and calculate the twelve state motions listed in Table 9. The axis for the state of motions 
is referenced in Figure 9. The various superscripts indicate the reference frame of the 
motion state, where ‘i’ is the Inertia frame; ‘b’ is the Body frame and ‘v’ is the Vehicle 
frame 
 
Table 9. State Variable for Air Vehicle Equations of Motion (Beard et al., 2012:29) 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9: Axes of Motion on UAS (Beard et al., 2012:29) 
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Several models of AP computers were employed in earlier AFIT research. This 
was attributed to the emergence of new and more capable products in the COTS market 
throughout the years. The evolution of AP computers used at AFIT began with “Piccolo 
II autopilot” (Jodeh, 2006: 11) and progressed to “KestrelTM autopilot” (Diamond et al., 
2009:30; Seibert et al., 2010:15) with the “Ardupilot Mega autopilot” (Shuck 2013:19) 
being used most recently.  
In this research, the “Pixhawk autopilot” was selected. The aforementioned AP 
computer shares the same developer as the “Ardupilot Mega autopilot” and was based on 
the firmware and software of the latter (3DR, nd).  The “Pixhawk autopilot” was selected 
as it offers more capabilities over its predecessor. These include separate power supply, 
more accurate position estimation and dual sensors. At the same time, application 
knowledge with the “Ardupilot Mega autopilot” from earlier research can also be 
employed due to similarity of firmware and software. The following table compares the 
key features that are available on the two AP computers. 
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Table 10: Comparison of “Pixhawk autopilot” and “Ardupilot Mega autopilot” 
Features and Fail-safes for “Pixhawk autopilot” and “Ardupilot Mega autopilot” 
Description Function 
Multi Mode of 
Control 
The AP computer supports numerous modes of flight control input. The three 
relevant modes are listed below; 
-“Manual Mode” the AP will relay the input from the RC transceiver to the 
servos and motor.  
- “Stabilized mode”. The AP computer will stabilize the RC inputs by damping 
out the servos’ close loop response to reduce oscillation in flight and maintain a 
straight and level flight.  
-“Autonomous mode” the AP computer will fly the UAV based on the 
waypoints and flight profile (mission plans) input by operator at the GS 
computer.  
Return to 
Home 
This function can be setup to be initiated from either the RC controller or 
“Mission Planner” on the GS laptop. Upon reaching the launch site (home), the 
AP computer will maintain the UAV in a loitering pattern and waits for further 
command. This facilities immediate contingency response in the event of a 
“Mission Planner” of RC controller failure.    
GS Fail-Safe This only applicable in the “Autonomous mode”. In the event that RF 
communication between the UAV and GS is loss, the AP computer will 
automatically return the UAV back to the launch site. 
Battery Fail-
Safe 
The battery voltage and current is measured by the AP computer.  A lower limit 
can be set to initiate a return to launch site when the measured value falls below 
the threshold.    
Geo-Fencing Permits setting up of a 3 dimensional flying boundary for the UAS. A 2 
dimensional polygonal shaped boundary can be set up through “Mission 
Planner” to restrict the UAS operation within a desired area. A maximum and 
minimum altitude prescribed by the operator will bound the height of the 
polygon. When the virtual fence-line is breeched, the AP computer will take 
over and the UAV will be flown autonomously to a pre-defined rally point 
within the geo-fencing boundary.  
Features and Fail-safes for “Pixhawk autopilot” 
Description Function 
Separate 
Power Supply 
Built with second input interface at servo rail for secondary power supply. The 
AP computer will switch over to servo rail power in the event of a failure with 
the main power bus. 
Dual Sensors Built-in with 2 accelerometer and gyroscope. Internal magnetometer works 
together with external magnetic compass for more reliable accurate positioning.   
GPS Fail-Safe In the event of a GPS failure, the AP computer has the ability to return to the 
launch site based on dead reckoning. 
 
Relating to autonomous control, the “Pixhawk autopilot” is integrated with a 
gyroscope, accelerometer, magnetometer and barometer (Pixhawk Specification, nd), see 
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Figure 10. The first three sensors provide the parameter data required to measure the 
pitch, roll and yaw movement of the air vehicle. The barometer is attached to a pitot-
static sensor that measures pressure and air speed. The altitude, latitude and longitude 
were derived by the “Pixhawk autopilot” from data provided by the external GPS and 
magnetic compass. 
 
 
Figure 10: Schematic of “Pixhawk Autopilot” for State Variable of Motion 
4.2.4 Integration of Preliminary Architecture 
 With the key components evaluated, a preliminary architecture was developed by 
integrating the identified components listed in Table 6 and is illustrated in the Figure 11. 
Tests were conducted on the key components in the next section to verify that the 
assigned components can fulfill the allocated functional requirement. 
 
49 
 
Figure 11: Preliminary Architecture of “SIG Racal 110” 
4.2.5 Testing of Preliminary Architecture 
Network Capable Modems  
The “RFD 900+” transceiver can be implemented either as a pair or multi-point 
network, up to 29 nodes. Multi-point network can only be configured with Version 2.5 
firmware. The implementation is differentiated through the configuration setting of the 
modems and defining the number of nodes in the network. When a modem is identified 
as ‘Node ID’ ‘0’ with ‘Node Destination’ ‘65535’, it functions as a base node and 
broadcasts to all the nodes in the network. ‘Node ID’ from ‘1’ to ‘29’with ‘Node 
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Destination’ ‘0’ functions as network nodes which communicate through the base node. 
The ‘Node Count’ determines the maximum of nodes permissible in the network.   
The multi point network can be exploited by setting up a second GS some 
distance away from the first GS. With the second GS maintaining visual LOS and control 
of the UAV, the UAV can safely transit beyond the visual range of the first GS. This can 
be used in incremental flight testing before progressing to beyond visual LOS operation 
with a single GS. The multi network capability was verified in a test through the use of a 
ground RC vehicle. See Figure 12 for test set up.   
 
 
Figure 12: Ground Test Setup for “RFD 900+” Network Capability 
 Two setups were tested with a three node network, two GS and one vehicle, to 
better understand the response of the network capability. The first test was setup with 
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default configuration of the modem with ‘Node Count’ ‘3’, ‘Node ID ‘2’ and ‘Node 
Destination’ ‘65535’. No interference was observed when the three operating nodes were 
placed next to each other. Subsequently, the transmission power was adjusted to the 
minimum (1 dBm).  The two GSs were placed some distance away from each other and a 
ground vehicle was operated from GS_1 to GS_2 in ‘Manual mode’, see Figure 13. When 
the GSs were placed at a distance where there was no transmission overlap, the AP 
computer will stop the vehicle when it exceeds the transmission range of the GS 1. By 
reducing the separation to allow for some transmission overlap, the vehicle was 
successfully operated between the two GSs.   
 
 
Figure 13: Ground Testing for “RFD 900+” Default Setting in Manual Mode 
The second test was setup with a base node. Similarly, no interference was 
observed when the three operating nodes were placed next to each other. It was verified 
that new mission plans could be updated to the ground vehicle through either GS. 
Mission plans are essentially a sequence of waypoints set in “Mission Planner” that the 
vehicle will travel to in the “Autonomous mode”. The latest update would be cached in 
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the AP computer and the ground vehicle executed the latest mission plan without 
anomaly when the “Autonomous mode” was selected.  
However, it is to note that the latest mission plan will only be reflected on the GS 
that provided the update and was not automatically reflected on the remaining GS in the 
network. Hence, the operator at the remaining GS observed that the autonomous 
movement of the vehicle did not correspond to their outdated mission plan. The latest 
mission plan will only be reflected when the operator at the remaining GS refreshes their 
mission plan on “Mission Planner”.  
Standard operating procedures can be implemented to prevent misunderstanding 
by the remaining GS that the AP computer is not working properly. Firstly, the operator 
that is updating a new mission plan must inform the other operators prior to uploading the 
waypoint. Next, in the event when an operator sees that the UAV is not heading towards 
the waypoint in his mission plan, the immediate respond shall be to refresh the mission 
plan and verify that it is not outdated. 
The ground test concludes that two GSs and a single vehicle can be safely 
operated in a network with the “Autonomous mode” at an extended distance as long as it 
maintains in the transmission range of at least one GS.  
Dual Diversity Antenna 
In Section 4.2.3, it was highlighted that the “RFD 900+” transceiver supports 
dual diversity antenna. A RF system will minimally require a pair of antennas, one to 
transmit, the other to receive. The ‘Rubber Ducky’ antenna used in the research is an 
omni directional antenna, and has an estimated gain of 5.5 dBi (Jacques et al., 2015). RF 
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signal propagate spherically from the side of an omni directional antenna with a null spot 
at the top antenna (Jacques et al., 2015), see following figure. Based on propagation 
direction of the RF signal, optimal reception is achieved when the length of the receiving 
antenna is parallel with the transmitting antenna. In the event where the two antennas are 
pointing at each other, the reception strength will be reduced. This situation may arise as 
the UAV banks and turns in flight.  
 
Figure 14: RF Propagation and Reception of RF Signals 
  
 
Figure 15: Orientation of RF Transmitting Antenna  
A test was conducted to measure the effect of the relative antenna position to the 
received signal strength. The “3DR-915 MHz” transceiver (3DR modem, nd) that 
supports only s single antenna was used for the test with the transmission power reduced 
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to 1 dBm. The two transceivers were separated by 30 m and the received signal strength 
was measured with the direction of the antenna placed at different orientations. The 
transmitting antenna was first orientated in plane with the receiving antenna by three 
angles (00, 450 and 900). This was repeated in the orthogonal plane; see the following 
figure for result. 
     
   Figure 16: Received Signal Strength at Different Antenna Orientation 
 It is observed that the received signal strength will be reduced when the 
orientation of antennas are not parallel. The least favorable orientation is when the two 
antennas are pointed directly at each other with a measured reduction of 18.7 dB. This is 
followed by a 900 orientation in the orthogonal plane with a 6.7 dB reduction. The 
orientations of the antennas were arranged in order from the highest received signal 
strength to the least in the following table. 
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Table 11: Results of Single Antenna Orientation Test  
S/N Antenna orientation Received signal strength (dB) 
Relative drop in signal 
strength (dB) 
1 Parallel -51.5 - 
2 450 in orthogonal plane -53.6 2.1 
3 450 in plane -55.8 4.3 
4 900 in plane -57.6 6.1 
5 900 in orthogonal plane -58.2 6.7 
6 Direct pointing -70.2 18.7 
 
Dual diversity permits two antennas to be installed orthogonally on the same 
transceiver. With orthogonal antennas, there is no instance when the receiving antennas 
are pointing directly at the transmitting antenna. Hence, the least favorable arrangement 
is a 900 in-plane rotation, see Figure 17. This mitigates the loss in signal strength to 6.1 
dB from 18.7 dB and brings about an improvement to the reliability of the RF 
communication as the UAV maneuvers in air.  
 
 
Figure 17: Least Favorable Dual Diversity Antenna Orientation  
The ground test concludes that selecting a transceiver with dual diversity antenna 
would improve the performance and range of the UAS compared to an exact transceiver 
that only has single antenna.   
900 in-plane rotation 
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Characterizing C2 Data Link (“RFD 900+”) 
A ground test was conducted to verify the transmission range of the “RFD 900+” 
transceiver which was installed with a half wavelength “rubber ducky” antenna. The 
degradation of signal strength between two “RFD 900+” transceivers when one was 
gradually moved apart from the other was measured using the “3DR Radio Configuration 
Utility” software. The software measures the received signal and noise level for both 
stationary and mobile transceivers at a frequency of 2 Hz. The test was conducted with a 
maximum separation of 200 m and repeated at different transmission power. The 
following figure illustrates the measurements from the ground test with a transmitted 
power of 1dBm (1.26 mW). 
 
 
Figure 18: Signal Measurement at 1 dBm Transmitted Power (“RFD 900+”) 
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The signals measured in time were translated to distance base on a uniform speed 
to travel the separation of 200 m. The average noise level in the figure was calculated 
directly from the measured data while the calculated signal strength was derived through 
a series of manipulations on Equation (1). The equation was first converted to decibel and 
then rearranged based on the separation distance.  Thereafter, the various parameters 
were condensed into a constant k that results in the equation shown below. 
𝑆𝑖 =  𝑃𝑇𝐺𝑇𝐿𝑇𝐿𝑃𝐺𝑅𝐿𝑅(
𝜆
4𝜋𝑅
)2  
  
Si = PT + k -20*log(R) (7) 
Where k = 10 log (𝐺𝑇𝐿𝑇𝐿𝑃𝐺𝑅𝐿𝑅) + 20log (
𝜆
4𝜋
) 
 
Equation (7) was mapped onto the preceding figure by assigning a value to the 
condensed constant k that forms a line of best fit which normalizes the measured received 
signal strength. For the “RFD 900+” that is used for the C2 data link, the value of kC2 for 
the test conducted at 1dBm transmitted power was -80 dB. This is represented by the line 
titled “Calculated Signal Strength”.  The normalized line was not fit to the entire range of 
measured signal strength. Instead, emphasis was placed at the end of the separation 
distance as the UAV is not expected to operate near the GS.  
The value of kC2 was also extended to normalize the measured signal strength at 
the transmission power of 2 dBm (1.58 mW) and 5 dBm (3.16mW). The results are 
illustrated in the two following figures. The table after the figures summarizes the 
measurements and results for all three tests.  
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Figure 19: Signal Measurement at 2 dBm Transmitted Power (“RFD 900+”) 
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Figure 20: Signal Measurement at 5 dBm Transmitted Power (“RFD 900+”) 
 
 
Table 12: Summary of Measurements on “RFD 900+” Transceiver  
 
TX Power 
(dBm) 
Noise at stationary transceiver (dB)  Noise at mobile transceiver (dB) 
Peak Trough Mean Peak Trough Mean 
1 -81.21 -105.95 -98.28 -75.95 -102.79 -94.97 
2 -83.34 -106.47 -98.72 -78.58 -103.84 -97.41 
5 -81.74 -104.37 -98.67 -79.12 -102.26 -96.30 
Average -82.10 -105.60 -98.56 -77.88 -102.96 -96.23 
Peak Average – Mean Average 16.46  18.34 
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From the preceding table, it is observed that the measured noise level at the 
mobile transceiver was consistently higher than the stationary transceiver across at all 
three power settings. For design margin, the noise level of -96.23 dB at the mobile 
transceiver was adopted. The difference between the ‘Average Peak’ and ‘Average 
Mean’ noise level at the mobile transceiver was 18.34 dB. This is within the expected 
link margin of 20 dBm that was applied in Table 8. 
At full transmitted power of 30 dBm (1 Watt), the degradation of signal strength 
with increasing distance was extrapolated using Equation (7), with kC2 at -80 dB. The 
‘Mean Average’ noise level at the mobile transceiver together with a 20 dB link margin 
were both imposed on the signal strength plot to calculate the maximum range of the 
system. The figure below illustrates the calculated range.     
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Figure 21: Calculated Range at 30 dBm Transmitted Power (“RFD 900+”) 
 The calculated range (20.48 km) from the ground test was 42.1% lower than the 
theoretical range (35.4 km) from Table 8, but was nevertheless above the required range 
of 4 km that was specified in Section 4.1. The calculated link margin available at 4 km is 
34.18 dB. It is noted that the expected range will vary as ambient RF noise will not be the 
same at different operating locations. In the presence of frequency interference, the 
maximum range will decrease significantly. In addition, the ground test was conducted 
with zero elevation difference between the two transceivers. Signal strength at the same 
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distance is expected to improve when the UAV is in the air as there will be less physical 
obstacles along the RF LOS between the two transceivers. 
Characterizing Image Data Link (“Aomway 5.8 GHz”) 
 A similar approach to verify the range for the Image data link was attempted on 
the “Aomway 5.8 GHz”. However, this was not feasible due to hardware requirements 
incompatible with the “3DR Radio Configuration Utility”. An alternative was explored 
by using a spectrum analyzer to directly measure the received signal strength and overlay 
it on the noise signal from the “RFD 900+” test. However, this was also not adopted as 
the unknown internal gains and losses of the spectrum analyzer will be introduced as 
additional variables to the analysis. 
Hence, an analogous calculation was made using the value of kC2. This is based on 
the assumption that the net transmission gain, reception loss and transceiver sensitivity of 
the Image data link is approximately the same as the C2 data link. The value of was kC2 
was adjusted to kimage by accounting for the higher transmission frequency.  
For a more comprehensive analogous calculation, the ground test for C2 data link 
was repeated with the single antenna “3DR-915 MHz” transceiver, to obtain an average 
value for the constant kC2. The “3DR-915 MHz” transceiver operates with a maximum of 
20 dBm (100 mW) in the frequency of 915 MHz (3DR modem, nd). The test was 
conducted with the stationary transceiver set to 20 dBm and the mobile transceiver at 1 
dBm (1.3 mw). It was observed that data link was lost when the mobile transceiver was at 
a distance of 260 m from the stationary.  
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Figure 22: Signal Measurement for “3DR Radio 915MHz” 
From the preceding figure, the value of kC2 that has a line of best fit onto the 
signal strength is -121 dB. Between the mobile and stationary transceivers, the higher of 
the two average noise received was at -108.63 dB. This measurement varied from the first 
C2 data link ground test using the “RFD 900+” (-96.23 dB) as the location was different. 
The following table summarizes the measurements for the two C2 data link ground tests. 
Calculation of the expected range of the Image data link was based on the average kimage 
and noise level from the two tests. 
 
 
Data link 
was lost 
at 260 m 
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Table 13: Comparison of Measurements from C2 Data Link Tests 
 “RFD 900” Setup “3DR-915 MHz" Setup Average 
kC2 @ 915 MHz (dB) -80 -121 -100.5 
Relative kimage @ 5.8 GHz (dB) -96.19 -137.19 -116.69 
Noise level (dB) -96.23 -108.63 -102.43 
 
Si =  PT + k -20*log(R) 
Noise Level +Link Margin =  PT + (kimage - Freq increase) - 20*log(R) 
-102.43 + Link Margin = 30 + (-116.69) – 20*log(4) 
Link Margin = 3.7 dB 
From the following figure, it was observed that, the calculated transmission range 
with a 20 dB link margin is only 0.61 km. Operation beyond 0.61 km may result in 
occasional loss of image when the transient spikes of noise exceed the received signal 
strength. At a transmission range of 4 km, the allowable link margin is reduced from 20 
dB to 3.7 dB. 
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 Figure 23: Analogous Range Calculation for Image Data Link 
To achieve undisrupted Image data link, a 23 dBi direction antenna 
(MyFlyDream, nd) was added to increase the reception gain. The original rubber ducky 
has an estimated gain of 5.5 dBi (Jacques et al., 2015). With a net gain of 17.5 dBi from 
the directional antenna, the calculated range is extended to 4.59 km. At the required range 
of 4 km there is an available link margin of 21.2 dB, see Figure 23. 
  
 
 
Distance (m) 
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4.3 Risk Management 
 This section starts with the definition on risk classification. Subsequently, it 
proceeds to examine the preliminary architecture and contingency procedures to identify 
potential risks and is followed by an analysis of its impact on SOF.  Thereafter, 
mitigations are implemented to reduce the residual risk of the final architecture to an 
acceptable level. 
 4.3.1 Risk Classification 
Risk is defined as a product of mishap severity and mishap probability. The 
severity and probability can be measured quantitatively or qualitatively. It is noteworthy 
that quantitative data on the reliability of UAS are limited (Cline, 2008:5), in particular, 
reliability data for small UAS is generally not available (Murtha, 2009:1). The 
categorization of risk severity and probability specified by AFIT’s TRB/SRB are shown 
in the following two tables (Air Force Institute of Technology, 2014). The qualitative 
assessment on the probability of failure used in this research was based on experiences 
from past UAS research effort in AFIT. 
 
Table 14. Categorization of Mishap Probability (Air Force Institute of Technology, 2014) 
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Table 15. Categorization of Mishap Severity (Air Force Institute of Technology, 2014) 
 
Severity is related to the consequence of mishap which includes two aspects, 
safety to human and cost of damage to system and property. The risk assessment and 
acceptance by the TRB/SRB is a comprehensive process which also covers possible 
accidents during preparation and pre-flight check. An example of such an accident is the 
inadvertent contact of the fingers with a spinning propeller.  
The focus of the research is on airworthiness of the UAV. Hence, the assessment 
is centered on the UAV when it is in flight and is derived from the consequence of 
individual component failure. The risk to personnel safety during handling of the system 
will be addressed separately during the TRB/SRB process.   
4.3.2 FMECA 
Risk identification and analysis were conducted inductively (bottom-up) through 
the use of FMECA. The different modes of failure that can occur on each component 
were identified and its consequential effect on the system was analyzed to establish the 
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level of risk it poses to SOF. To optimize the architecture, the components were grouped 
based on their functional domain in the FMECA to facilitate possible development of 
mitigating solutions that are applicable to more than one component or failure mode. 
 
 
Figure 24: Functional Grouping of Components in FMECA 
Two functional domains, Payload and Structure, were not covered in the FMECA. 
Depending on the nature of operation, different missions require different payloads. 
Therefore, FMECA on the payload will be conducted separately in the future upon 
clarification of mission requirements. The structural design of COTS RC model aircraft 
have been validated by a large base of recreational users. Hence, FMECA is not 
conducted for this domain unless the original structure was modified.  
Mitigations in the form of hardware redundancy for low-cost UAS are typically 
constrained by size, weight, power and budget (Freeman et al., 2014:1). Hence, careful 
consideration was taken to ensure that redundancy was not excessively introduced for the 
mitigations in the FMECA. In total, there are 34 risks attributing to the various failure 
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modes from the 16 components in the preliminary architecture. The detailed analysis on 
the risk of each failure mode and its mitigation is documented in Appendix A. The results 
of the FMECA and its risk mitigation are summarized in Table 16. 
 
Table 16. Summary of Design Improvements and Contingency Procedures 
S/N Component Mitigation Probability Severity Design Procedure 
1 Primary Battery 
-Dual power supply for AP computer 
-Separate power supply between  motor, 
avionics and payload 
-Connector clips 
-Parallel battery arrangement 
-Battery fail-safe 
E IV 
2 
GPS/ 
Magnetic 
Compass 
-Backup flight mode (Manual) -GPS fail-safe 
D IV 
3 Pitot-static Sensor 
-Backup flight mode (Manual) NA E IV 
4 
Telemetry/ 
Command 
Transceiver 
-Separate frequency spectrum  
-Frequency hopping capability 
-GS fail-safe 
-Geo fence E IV 
5 Aileron Servo -Individual power supply for servo, 
avionics  and motor 
-Connector clips 
-Battery fail-safe 
E IV 6 
Elevator 
Servo 
7 Rudder Servo 
8 Flap Servo 
9 Motor -Retain manual flight control for non-
powered landing NA E III 10 Propeller 
11 AP Computer 
-Backup flight mode (Manual) 
- Separate power supply between  motor, 
avionics and payload 
-Dual power supply for AP computer 
NA 
E III 
12 ESC 
-Retain manual flight control for non-
powered landing 
-Power module to limit maximum current 
NA 
E III 
13 BEC -Dual power supply NA E IV 
14 Mission Planning S/W 
NA -Return to launch 
site from RC 
controller 
E IV 
15 RC controller NA -Return to launch site from laptop E IV 
16 Laptop 
- Backup flight mode (Manual) 
-Separate display for FPV image 
-OSD to impose telemetry on FPV image 
 NA 
E IV 
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  Among the risks of all the failure modes on a component, the rating with the 
highest probability and worst severity was taken and listed in the last two columns of the 
table. Details for the various fail-safes mentioned in the table can be found in Appendix 
B. 
There are a total of one hundred and twenty (�162 � = 120) permutations in which 
two out of the sixteen components can fail. This is compounded with variation of 
multiple failure modes for each permutation. The FMECA did not consider dual 
components failure as a simultaneous occurrence which individually has ‘very unlikely’ 
probability is extremely remote. An exhaustive analysis for such remote probability of 
occurrence will yield minimal value in improving the design of the architecture.  
4.3.3 Risk Analysis 
Risk acceptance by AFIT’s TRB/SRB is based on an integrated assessment 
matrix, of severity and probability. Risks residing in the region of ‘Medium Risk’ will not 
be accepted (Air Force Institute of Technology, 2014:7) and thus require further 
mitigation. The risks associated with each component failure listed in the preceding table 
are mapped onto the assessment matrix in the Figure 25.  
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Figure 25: Risk Mapping on Assessment Matrix (AFIT, 2014) 
Post mitigation, the risks associated with the failures of most components has 
been reduced to the region of ‘Negligible Risk’. Those that remained in the region of 
‘Low Risk’ are associated with the possibility when unaware personnel did not move out 
of the landing path of the UAV during a non-powered landing.  
For Risk #9 (Motor failure) and #10 (Propeller failure), further mitigation could 
not be implemented without a change in fuselage design to a twin engine platform. 
Mitigation to Risk #12 (ESC failure) may be implemented through parallel ESC 
operation.  However, this is restricted by the capability of the AP computers. The 
2 
9, 10, 11, 12 
 
1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7,  
 
8, 13, 14, 15, 16 
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“Pixhawk autopilot” has the ability to control multiple motors each with its individual 
ESC. However, it does not have the ability to control a motor through two parallel ESCs.   
For Risk #11 (AP computer failure), a complete AP computer failure is defined as 
a situation where no data or power is passed through or processed by the “Pixhawk 
Autopilot”. Further mitigation for this risk is possible with a second AP computer that 
shares the same input and has either 1) an independent output or 2) a parallel output.  The 
prior would require a switch to select which AP computer to be in control. However, the 
switch would present itself as a single point of failure. If the reliability of the switch is 
lower than the AP computer, it would increase the overall probability of a loss in AP 
control.  
The second option with parallel output could not be achieved as the firmware for 
“Pixhawk autopilot” does not support parallel operation of two AP computers. 
Furthermore, it does not permit one in backup mode. Literature review has also revealed 
that there is no known COTS AP computer that possesses the required capability to 
support dual auto pilot operation. Hence, the residual risk is retained in the Low Risk 
region which is acceptable by the TRB/SRB.  
4.4 Intermediate Architecture 
 The next figure shows the integrated architecture of the UAS post mitigation from 
the FMECA. Iterative testing was conducted to verify the new features that were added 
and are documented in the next section.  
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Figure 25: Intermediate Architecture of UAS Post FMECA 
 
4.5 Iterative Testing of Intermediate Architecture 
Manual RC control and Geo-Fencing are the two key features added in the 
intermediate architecture. The manual RC control serves as a back-up mode to the AP 
computer. The Geo-Fencing feature in the “Pixhawk autopilot” is programmed to 
prevent the UAV from flying beyond the transmission range of the transceivers.    
Characterizing RC Data Link (“Taranis” and “FrSky L9R”) 
Manual RC flight is a common mode of control used by recreational users and is 
regularly integrated with a COTS AP computer for stabilized or autonomous flight. 
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Verification on the transmission range of the RC transceiver is necessary to ensure that it 
can accommodate the specified distance. The RC controller manufactured by “Taranis” 
was used in earlier research. To maintain familiarity by the Ground Operator, the 
“Taranis” RC controller was retained. Familiarity with the RC controller during flight 
testing is essential as the Ground Operator functions as the safety pilot and responses to 
contingency through the “Manual mode”. 
The operating frequency of the RC data link is 2.4 GHz and uses digital 
modulation which does not conflict with the C2 and Image data link. The RC commands 
are input through the “Taranis” controller by the Ground Operator and received by the 
“FrSky L9R” transceiver on board the Air vehicle. In return, the transceiver would send 
regular signals to the controller which informs the Ground Operator that communication 
link between the transceivers is still intact.  
Adopting the same approach used for the Image data link, the range of the RC 
Data link was calculated using Equation (7). For undisrupted transmission, the RC Signal 
Strength (Si) received by the UAV must be equal to or greater than the combined noise 
level and allocated link margin. From “Taranis” manual (Taranis, nd), the transmitted 
power is 100 mW (20 dBm). Similar to the Image data link, the average noise level 
measured from the two C2 data link test was used. Compensating for the lower 
transmission frequency, the range of the RC data link is shown with the following 
calculation. 
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Si =  PT + k -20*log(R)  
Noise Level +Link Margin =  PT + (kC2 - Freq increase) - 20*log(R)  
-102.43 + 20 = 20 + (-100.5 - 7.67) – 20*log(R)  
20*log (R) = -5.74  
R = 0.52 km  
 The calculated transmission range with a 20 dB link margin is 0.52 km. Without 
the link margin, the range increases to 5.16 km. At 4 km, the link margin is reduced from 
20 dB to 2.22 dB. The distance rated for “FrSky L9R” receiver with a “Taranis” 
controller is 3 km to 5 km (Frsky L9R, nd).  The comparable value between calculated 
and rated range provided further assurance on the assumptions for the k factor and noise 
level.  
To reduce disruption to the RC data link within the 4 km range, the link margin is 
compensated with an increase in transmission power. However, amplification of RF 
power is limited to 1,000 mW (30 dBm) for a carrier signal at 2.4 GHz (Code of Federal 
Regulation, 2009: 824; Federal Communications Commission, 1996: 20). With an 
increase of 10 dB, the undisrupted range is increased to 1.6 km. Without the 20 dB link 
margin, the range is extended to 16.3 km. When operating at the 4 km range, the 
permissible link margin is reduced to 12.22 dB.  The rated range for a 1,000 mW 
amplifier with 2.4 GHz is 4 to 8 miles (6.4 -12.9 km) (3DR Amplifier, nd). 
The regulatory limit on the amplification of the transmitted power was attributed 
to the cap of 36 dBm on the EIRP when the antenna gain is specified at 6 dBi. However, 
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there is provision in the regulation to increase the antenna gain by reducing the 
transmitted power. At 30 dBm (1,000 mW) transmitted power, for every 3 dBi increase in 
antenna gain, the transmission power must be reduced by 1 dBm (Code of Federal 
Regulation, 2009: 825).  
Si =  PT + k -20*log(R) 
Noise Level +Link Margin =  PT + (kC2 - Freq increase + gain increase) - 20*log(R) 
-102.43 + 20 = 24.77 + (-100.5 - 7.67 + 13.5) – 20*log(R) 
R = 4.23 km 
If the transmission power is boosted to 300 mW (24.77 dBm) and a directional 
antenna with 19 dBi gain was used, there will be an overall increase of 18.27 dB in the 
range calculation in Equation (7). Recalling Section 2.4.5, the net gain in the k factor with 
the directional antenna will be reduced to 13.5 dBi. These modifications will ensure that 
there will be adequate link margin for the RC data link within the 4.23 km. 
 
Table 17. Summary of Results for Different RC Data Link Configuration   
Configuration 
Range (km) Link Margin 
at 4 km (dB) With 20 dB Link Margin 
Without 20 dB 
Link Margin Rated 
Normal 0.52 5.16 3 - 5 2.22 
Antenna Gain (24 dBi) 4.35 43.45 NA 20.7 
Increase Power (300mW) 1.6 16.33 6.4 - 12.9 12.22 
Increase Power & Antenna Gain (19dBi) 4..23 42.32 NA 20.5 
 
Geo-Fencing 
Geo-Fencing is a feature on the “Pixhawk autopilot” that was not employed in 
previous AFIT research. This feature is adapted in the architecture to restrict the flight 
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profile of the UAS within a desired location and altitude range. The Geo-fence is set up 
on the geo-map in the “Mission Planner” with a polygon of maximum 18 points. The 
maximum and minimum altitude are also defined as part of the setup. 
Ground tests were conducted to familiarize with the feature and to verify the 
response when the fence is breached. The details on the Geo-Fencing feature of “Pixhawk 
autopilot” are documented in Appendix B. Hardware in the Loop testing was carried out 
in the laboratory. The airborne sub-system was simulated through the software called 
“Flight Gear” which generates the necessary flight data to the “Pixhawk autopilot” 
though the “Mission Planner”. However, due to compatibility issues between the 
versions of software that were available in the laboratory the desired response could not 
be simulated. Consequently, a ground test was setup.  
The ground test was conducted with a partial setup of the system as shown in 
Figure 28.  Without the propulsion subsystem, the “Air Vehicle” was carried and moved 
towards the Geo-fence line with the system set in “Manual flight” mode. Upon passing 
the fence line, the “Pixhawk autopilot” immediately switches itself into “Guide flight” 
mode with the direction of the UAV’s intended heading aligning to the rally point in 
“Mission Planner”. 
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Figure 26: Setup for Geo-Fencing Ground Test 
 It must be highlighted that in flight, the Air Vehicle will require some time to 
change its flight profile and turn back to the rally point. Hence, some distance must be 
buffered for the Geo-fence. This distance will depend on the flight characteristics of the 
Air Vehicle, maximum prescribed bank angle and turning radius.  Test flights within 
visual LOS will be conducted to verify the buffer distance required by the “SIG Rascal 
110” to turn back to the rally point upon a breech in Geo-fence. 
4.6 Final Architecture 
 The final architecture of the small UAS and the range of the various data links are 
shown in the following figure and table. The concept to operate the UAS beyond visual 
LOS is depicted in Figure 28. Progressing from bench tests, the architecture is 
incrementally tested in visual LOS flight to verify the various functions. The conduct of 
the test flights and its results will be discussed in the next chapter.  
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Figure 27: Final Architecture of UAS 
 
Table 18. Summary of Transmission Range for Individual Data Links   
Data link 
type 
Frequency 
Range 
Max. Range with 
20 dB link margin 
Link Margin 
at 4 km (dB) Remark 
C2 915 Mhz 20.48 km 34.18 Nil 
RC 2.4 GHz 4.23 km 20.5 300 mW amplification and 19 dBi directional antenna 
Image 5.8 Ghz 4.59 km 21.2 23 dBi directional antenna 
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Figure 28: Concept for Beyond LOS Operation 
4.7 Bill of Material 
 Using the empty weight cost of $10,000/lbs for the “Dragon Eye”, the 11 lbs “SIG 
Rascal 110” would cost $110,000. Table 19 shows the BOM and the corresponding cost 
for the design. Base on the architecture with COTs component, the total cost is 
$2,094.24. Comparatively, a loss of a COTS based UAV will only cost 2% of an UAV 
that meets military specifications. The empty weight cost is calculated from the UAV and 
does not include the equipment and components at the GS. Refer to Appendix C for 
source reference on cost of product.  
 
 
 
 
81 
Table 19. Bill of Material for Final Architecture   
Description Qty Unit Cost Cost 
Sig Rascal 110 1 $549.99 $549.99 
Servo 7 $0.00 $0.00 
Motor (HimaxHC6332-230 Brushless Electric Motor) 1 $199.99 $199.99 
Propeller (APC 19x10E) 1 $12.99 $12.99 
Anti Spark (50 Ohm resistor) 1 $0.00 $0.00 
Arming Switch 1 $12.99 $12.99 
ESC (120 A) 1 $265.95 $265.95 
PM (45 V) 1 $21.28 $21.28 
Pixhawk Autopilot computer 1 $199.99 $199.99 
Telemetry Transmitter (RFD 900+ modem) 1 $89.50 $89.50 
Telemetry Antenna (900MHz) 2 $7.95 $15.90 
RC Transceiver 1 $38.95 $38.95 
Video transmitter (Aomway 5.8 GHz TX 1000) 1 $84.90 $84.90 
BEC 1 $24.99 $24.99 
Diode 1 $0.00 $0.00 
GPS/Magnetic Compass 1 $89.99 $89.99 
Pitot-static Sensor 1 $54.99 $54.99 
OSD 1 $16.32 $16.32 
Camera (Hack HD camera PCB) 1 $164.95 $164.95 
Voltage regulator (5 V) 1 $6.65 $6.65 
Battery (Primary - 6 cell 8,000mAh ) 4 $40.43 $161.72 
Battery (Backup - 3 cell 1,300mAh) 2 $11.90 $23.80 
Battery (Payload - 3 cell 1,300mAh) 1 $11.90 $11.90 
Total $2,047.74 
 
4.8 Summary 
This chapter began by defining the system specification for the requirements and 
the evaluation of key components. Thereafter, the iterative development for the physical 
architecture through the use of FMECA as a risk management approach was documented. 
A bill of material at the end of the chapter tabulates the cost of the UAV in the final 
architecture and compares it to the cost of a similar size UAV based on the empty weight 
cost of the “Dragon Eye”. Incremental flight testing will be conducted within visual LOS 
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to progressively verify key aspects of the architecture to garner confidence before an 
actual flight beyond visual LOS. This progressive testing will be elaborated in the next 
chapter.  
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V.  Test Results and Post Test Hazard Analysis 
The MFR for the “SIG Rascal 110” prescribes that the UAV must always be 
maintained within visual LOS during operation, either by the operator or ground 
observers. This means that the UAV can fly beyond the visual LOS of the operator 
provided that a forward deployed observer maintains visual contact and has means of 
communication with the GS. Incremental flights test will be designed on this principle to 
progressively verify key aspects of the architecture. 
5.1 Incremental Test Flights 
 A series of tests was designed to incrementally verify the capability of the 
architecture in order to garner confidence for an actual flight that is beyond visual LOS. 
The first series of flight tests is aimed at verifying the features in the architecture that 
were not present in previous research, namely the network capability of the “RFD 900+” 
and the Geo-fencing of the “Pixhawk autopilot”.  
The first series of flight tests was conducted within visual LOS from the operator 
and scaled down transmission power of the “RFD 900+” to simulate operation in a 
farther range. As the payload is not required for the test, the corresponding components 
were not installed. See the following figure for the tested architecture.    
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Figure 29: Architecture of Flight Tested UAS 
In Section 4.3.1, it was discussed that the risk assessment for personnel safety 
during handling of the system will be addressed separately during the TRB/SRB process. 
The details on the aforementioned assessment, together with the test procedures, can be 
referenced to the approved TRB/SRB document (Seah, 2015).  
 5.1.1 Network Capability Test 
Discussed in Section 4.2.5, the network capability of the “RFD 900+” transceiver 
can be used to gain confidence on the architecture so as to incrementally extend the 
operating range to beyond visual LOS. At the lowest transmission power (1 dBm) of the 
“RFD 900+” transceivers, the maximum allowable separation distance between the GS 
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and UAV was calculated. From Section 4.2.5 the measure kC2 is -80 dB. Using the 
average noise of -96.23 dB and factoring a 20 dB link margin, the calculated range from 
Equation (7) is 0.727 km  
 
Si = PT + k -20*log(R) (7) 
-96.23 + 20 = 1 -80 -20*log (R)  
R =  0.727 km  
From section 4.1.2, the range for visual LOS operation with “SIG Rascal 110”” is 
approximately 300 m and 600 m in “Manual mode” and “Autonomous mode”, 
respectively. From section 4.5, the transmission range of the RC transceiver, with 20 dB 
link margin, is 520 m. To safely conduct a flight test that is permissible by the MFR, the 
two GSs were separated by approximately 200 m, a distance which the safety pilot can 
safely control the UAV in “Manual mode” from GS_1 in the event of an emergency.  
A total of three tests were designed and conducted to verify the network 
capability of the UAS. This was carried out with the two GSs co-located next to each 
other. The capabilities tested were 1) updating of mission plan in the network, 2) network 
redundancy with one ground node disconnected and 3) network fail-safe with all ground 
nodes disconnected.  These tests were conducted with a mission plan that is created 
between the two GS, and within the permitted flight altitude. The test flight envelope is 
reflected by the non-shaded area in the following figure.  
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Figure 30: Airspace Envelope for Flight Test 
 Network Update 
A flight test similar to the ground test conducted in Section 4.2.5 was replicated. 
While the UAV was loitering above a prescribed location in “Autonomous mode”, a new 
waypoint was updated to the mission plan from GS_1, with GS_2 intentionally 
maintained with the outdated plan. No anomaly was observed when the UAV received 
the new mission plan and preceded flying towards the new waypoint. The telemetry and 
flight path of the UAV for the new mission plan was correctly reflected in both GSs. 
However, as the mission plan at GS_2 was not updated, the new flight path did not 
correspond to the outdated plan to loiter at the initial location. Nonetheless, this does not 
have any adverse effect on the UAS.  
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Network Redundancy 
A second test was conducted to verify the robustness of the network. In a 
repetition of the first test, while the UAV is flying towards the new way point, the 
transceiver at GS_1 was disconnected. At the same time, the mission plan at GS_2 was 
refreshed. The test was successfully conducted with no anomaly observed on the UAS 
and the current mission plan.  
Network Fail-Safe 
The third test began with the UAV loitering above a prescribed location in 
“Autonomous mode”. A new mission plan was updated from GS_1. While the UAV was 
executing the mission plan both GSs were disconnected and reconnected immediately. 
Reconnection took less than the allocated Fail-safe duration of 20 sec. During this period, 
no anomaly was observed on the UAV as it continues with its current mission plan.  
The test was repeated, but this time, the two GSs were intentionally left 
disconnected beyond the 20 sec Fail-safe duration. It was observed that the UAV 
responded accordingly to the Fail-safe sequence and return to the launch site after 20 sec. 
Thereafter, the connection was reestablished and the UAV promptly resumed its last 
mission plan. 
The three set of tests concluded that there will be no anomaly to the UAS as long 
as one GS remains in transmission with the UAV. It also demonstrated that the UAV will 
respond to the latest mission plan that is cached in its AP computer. Outdated mission 
plan reflected in the remaining ground nodes will not have an adverse effect to the UAS. 
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In the event of a GS reconnection after a complete loss of network transmission, the UAV 
will resume its current mission plan after it recovers from the fail-safe action. 
5.1.2 Geo-Fencing Test 
 The Geo-fence was manually activated with a Pulse Width Modulation (PWM) 
signal from the RC console that was set above 1,750. The fence will remain activated as 
long as the AP computer receives a PWM signal that is above 1,750. The response to a 
breach in Geo-fence was verified for operations in the three commonly employed modes 
“Autonomous mode”, “Stabilized mode” and “Manual mode”.  A Geo-fence was set 
around the GS with its boundary within visual LOS and the permissible flight altitude, 
refer to Figure 30. A rally point (location and altitude) was identified within the boundary 
for the UAV to return and loiter around when the fence is breached. This test was carried 
out with intentional breaches to the Geo-fence boundary. 
 The original intent was to activate the Geo-fence through “Mission Planner” from 
the GS. However, it was realized during the flight test that this approach was not feasible 
as PWM signal can only be transmitted from the RC console. The last available PWM 
switch on the RC console for the Sig Rascal 110 was configured for a separate geo-
mapping test and decision was made not alter the setup. The test was eventually carried 
out with a Super Sky Surfer UAS that was installed with the “ArduPilot Mega” AP 
computer instead. There is no difference in the Geo-fence feature for the “Pixhawk” and 
“ArduPilot Mega” AP computer as they share the same firmware and software. 
From the GS, it was observed that the AP computer responded immediately upon 
a breach in the fence boundary. In all three modes, the UAV switched over to “Guided-
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mode” and returned to the rally point when it breached the fence boundary. Once inside 
the boundary, the “Guided-mode” can be switched out through a cycle of the mode 
switch on the RC console to regain control of the UAV. Due to inertia, the UAV requires 
some response distance to change its flight heading and return back to the fence 
boundary. The turn radius will depend on the aerodynamic capability and the control 
setting of the UAV. For the SIG Rascal 110, a response distance of 30 m is recommended 
and should be factored in as part of the area where the UAV is not permitted to operate 
outside.  
No anomaly was observed on the function of the Geo-fence feature. However, 
two operational concerns were noted during the test. Firstly, the flight path overlay on the 
map and Geo-fence boundary is only visible from the GS console. During “Manual 
mode” or “Stabilized mode” the safety pilot can only estimate the boundary and may not 
be aware that the UAV has breached the fence which result a switch to “Guided-mode”. 
There is no indication of “Guide-mode” on the safety pilot’s RC console. Without active 
communication from the GS to signal a breech in fence boundary, the safety pilot may 
misinterpret that there is a failure in the RC console as the UAV is not responding to the 
manual controls, resulting to unwarranted distress. 
The second concern is on switching out from “Guided mode” after a breach in 
boundary. To toggle out of “Guided mode”, the safety pilot will cycle the mode switch on 
the RC console. This however will not have any effect if the UAV is still outside the 
boundary. To regain control of the UAV while it is outside the fence, the safety pilot will 
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first have to de-activate the Geo-fence before toggling the mode switch. The safety pilot 
will similarly be subjected to unwarranted distress without familiarity to this response.  
5.1.3 UAV Setting 
 The setting on the UAV was documented in Table 20 to facilitate replication of 
the system. 
 
Table 20: Flight Setting of Autopilot Computer 
Servo Gains Roll Servo Pitch Servo Yaw servo 
Proportional 1.5 1.5 1 
Integral 0.04 0.07 0.1 
Derivative 0.1 0.1 0.05 
Max Integrator 15 15 15 
 
Total Energy 
Control System 
Max Climb Min Sink Max Sink Pitch Dampening 
Tine 
Constant 
5 (m/s) 2 (m/s) 5 (m/s) 0 5 
 
Airspeed 
(m/s) 
Cruise Min Fly-by-wire Max Fly-by-wire Ratio 
20 12 40 1.994 
 
Throttle 
(0-100%) 
Cruise Min Max Slew Rate 
50 20 60 100 
 
Navigation Angle Max Bank Pitch Max Pitch Min 45 15 -25 
 
L1 Control – Turn 
Control 
Period Damping 
25 0.75 
 
Other Max P to T Rudder Mix - 0.5 
 
5.1.4 Battery Consumption 
 The battery consumption for the motor and the avionics/servo were characterized 
to facilitate endurance planning for future research. When applying the consumption rate, 
a 10% safety factor is recommended as the flight condition and profile will not be the 
same for all operation.  
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• Average consumption rate for the avionics/servos bus was 2,700 mA per hour.  
• Average consumption rate for the motor bus was 10,982 mA per hour. 
5.2 Post Fight Test Hazard Analysis 
 Results from the flight test have verified the robustness of the network capability 
and the dependability of the Geo-fencing feature. No new or unforeseen hazard was 
observed during the test. The successful flight test provided assurance on the designed 
capability and paves the way for the next sequences of flight tests which will 
progressively and incrementally test the architecture’s capability to extend the operating 
range beyond visual LOS.  The subsequent sequence of flight tests is discussed in the 
next section. 
5.3 Proposed Approach for Sequential Flight Test 
The following sequence of flight tests is proposed to progressively test the 
architecture capability with incremental range. The aim is to collect test points at 
increased range for the application of a new MFR to operate beyond visual LOS.  
Sequence Two Flight Test 
The second sequence will test the full architecture of the UAS which includes the 
payload that was not installed during the first flight test. This test will be conducted 
within visual LOS at full transmission power, but with an increased separation distance 
between the two GS to 400 m which is twice that of the first sequence. A safety pilot will 
be positioned between the two GSs to retain the ability to control the UAV in “Manual 
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mode”. This will facilitate as a backup in the event of an unforeseen failure with the 
architectural integration.  
Seamless RF transmission is assured through the characterization of the various 
transceivers in Chapter 4. The separation distance of 400 m between the two GS will be 
within the 4 km designed transmission range (with 20 dB link margin). In addition, the 
flight boundary of the test envelope will also be contained by the Geo-fence. This is 
illustrated with the non-shaded area in the following figure. 
 
Figure 31: Concept for Second Sequence of Flight Test  
Sequence Three Flight Test 
A successful test flight on the second sequence would be the final verification to 
the integration of the full architecture and will provide assurance that the architecture will 
perform as designed. The third sequence of test flight will increase the separation 
distance between the two GSs to 1.4 km which exceed the visual LOS from the individual 
GS. This distance would also be the furthest operating range for past and current AFIT 
research on small UAS.  
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Complying with the MFR’s requirement, the safety pilot will be positioned 
between the two GS to provide overlap and maintain visual LOS throughout the entire 
separation. From Chapter 4, the separation distance of 1.4 km between the two GS will be 
within the 4 km designed transmission range (with link margin). Hence, RF link for the 
C2 data and image data between the individual GS and the UAV would be maintained 
throughout the test boundary. This will be the same for the RC data link between the 
UAV and RC console of the safety pilot. Refer to the following figure for the concept of 
the third sequence of test flight. 
 
 
 
Figure 32: Concept for Third Sequence of Flight Test  
Incremental testing with the three aforementioned sequences will provide the data 
points required to verify that the designed UAS can successfully operate over a distance 
of 1.4 km. The successful test points where GS_1 still has RF link with the UAV when it 
is flying above GS_2 can then be used to seek an approval for a second MFR to operate 
the UAS over the tested range of 1.4 km with a single GS. Thereafter, Sequence Three of 
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the flight test can be iterated to build upon the data points for an operating distance of 2.8 
km between two GSs.  
With the concluded test point, a third MFR will be sought to operate an UAV up 
to the range of 2.8 km with a single GS. The designed range of 4 km will finally be tested 
at the third iteration of Sequence Three flight test. Alternatively, with the second MFR to 
operate at a range of 1.4 km, four GSs can be arranged in a line with a total separation 
distance of 4.2 km between the first and last GS.  
5.4 Summary 
The flight test conducted for this research demonstrated the capability and 
robustness of the new features in the designed architecture that were not employed in 
previous AFIT research. The responses of the UAS to these features were also 
documented in the chapter to facilitate application of the architecture for possible future 
research efforts. Finally the achievement of the flight test with no new hazard observed 
reflects the level of comprehensiveness in the risk assessment and iterative designing 
process that was carried out in Chapter 4 of the research. 
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VI.  Conclusions and Recommendations 
This chapter concludes the research and highlights its significance. Thereafter, 
recommendations are also made for future work. 
6.1 Conclusions of Research 
The research has achieved two of the three objectives that were established in 
Section 1.2. The first objective is to develop the architecture for a small UAS, based on 
COTS components, which is capable of operating at a distance five times that of the 
visual LOS range. This was achieved through parametric analysis and ground testing.  
The second objective is to establish a framework and document the development 
process to facilitate effective and reliable replication on other AFIT small UAS for future 
research. The effectiveness of the framework was demonstrated with the successful 
designing and testing of the UAS in a short period of nine months. The reliability of the 
UAS architecture developed through the framework was vindicated by the successful 
flight tests. Finally, the characterization data, test procedures and the results were 
documented to facilitate future replication.  
The last objective to validate the designed architecture and to seek air worthiness 
to operate beyond visual LOS was not fully achieved. This was attributed to the 
incremental approach of flight testing and MFR revisions discussed in Chapter 5. This 
process required considerable lead time which extended beyond the duration of the 
research. Hence, a proposed sequence of flight testing was documented in Section 5.3 as 
a continuation to complete the remaining objective.  
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With the completion of this research, the three investigative questions identified 
in Section 1.3 were addressed as below.  
i. What are the requirements for a framework to effectively and reliably repeat the 
capability on other small UASs? 
A structured framework to repeat the development of the architecture and apply 
them on other UAS was adapted from the DoD System Engineering Process. The 
requirements were documented in Section 3.1 of this research.  
ii. What COTS components are required in a small UAS architecture to operate 
beyond visual LOS and how is the architecture integrated and validated? 
From the framework established for the previous question, the architecture of the 
small UAS to operate beyond visual LOS was developed through an iterative designing 
process. Integration and validation of the architecture was demonstrated by the successful 
conduct of flight test and documented in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5. The final architecture 
employed for the UAS is documented in Section 4.6. The COTS components required for 
the architecture can be found in Section 4.7 of this thesis. 
iii.  What are the hazards associated with beyond visual LOS operation and how can 
they be mitigated to achieve airworthiness approval? 
The hazards associated with beyond LOS operation were identified and mitigated 
through the FMECA process. The outcome is summarized in Section 4.3.2 and the details 
can be found in Appendix A of the document.  
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The COTS based UAS architecture offered an economical alternative that 
required a shorter development time compared to conventional design and build 
approach. As a comparison to the empty weight cost of a conventional UAS with 
components that meets military specification, the COTS based “SIG Rascal 110” cost 
98% less. The total development time from design and prototyping, including 
documentation, for the UAS took nine months.  
6.2 Significance of Research 
Two significant issues were drawn from the research. Firstly, the legally available 
COTS transceivers for the RC and Image data links selected to achieve a range of 4 km 
for the “Sig Rascal 110” is at the edge of current technological limits. To further increase 
the range, an improvement in technology to economically increase the sensitivity to the 
transceivers is required. This will increase the overall system gain in the link budget 
without exceeding the legal limit on the transmission power.  
Alternatively, a change in transmitting frequency can be adopted. Indicated in 
Equation (2), a reduction in frequency will increase the transmission range at the same 
power. From the research on long range flights in Section 2.5.3, the following 
frequencies may be used as an alternative to increase the operating range with current 
technological limits. 
 
Table 21: Comparison of Current and Alternate Transmission Frequencies  
 C2 data link RC data link Image data link 
Current 915 MHz 2.4 GHz 5.8 GHz 
Alternative No change 433 MHz 2.4 GHz or 1.3 GHz 
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To adopt the alternate frequencies, new considerations have to be addressed. In 
particular, license is required to transmit beyond 12 mW and 75 mW in the 433 MHz 
band and 1.3 GHz respectively.  
Secondly, the use of COTS component has its inherent challenges in dealing with 
rapid changes in technology. The components identified for the architecture may be 
replaced by new and better alternatives and will no longer be available after a short span 
of time. The interface and relationship between the individual components architecture 
illustrated in the architecture will facilitate the selection and integration of new 
replacement components to the existing system. 
6.3 Recommendations for Future Research 
 As a continuation to achieve a MFR to operate at the designed range of 4 km, the 
incremental testing proposed in Section 5.3 is recommended. In addition, the network 
capability of the C2 transceiver may be explored for multiple UAV control from a single 
GS. This can theoretically be achieved by configuring the GS as the base node instead of 
its current arrangement as a network node. 
. 
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Appendix A: Failure Mode Effect and Criticality Analysis 
1. Power Supply Sub-system 
Component: Battery (Primary) 
Hazard Effect Mitigation Prob Severity Mode Causal factor Immediate System Health Cost 
Loss of 
component 
function 
Component failure 
-Loss of power to 
motor 
 
-Loss of power 
AP computer 
-Loss of thrust 
 
-Aircraft enters into a 
controlled  non-
power descend 
Design 
-Separate power supply from avionics 
and payload 
 
-Dual power supply to AP computer to 
maintain power to servo and transceivers  
 
-Parallel battery arrangement to maintain 
adequate voltage supply when one series of 
battery fails 
E IV IV 
Depleted capacity 
Exceed planned 
duration 
Procedure 
-Pixhawk has a configurable Battery fail-
safe logic to initiate return to launch site 
when battery reached a set minimum 
voltage and/or battery capacity level. 
E IV IV 
Insufficient Charge 
Procedure 
-Labels to identify expended battery from 
charged ones 
E IV IV 
Loss connection 
Connector failure  Procedure -Full-functional check prior to launch E IV IV 
Loose connectors 
Design 
-Used of connector clips to ensure security 
between wire connectors 
E IV IV 
Overall E IV 
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Component: Battery (laptop) 
Hazard Effect Mitigation Prob Severity Mode Causal factor Immediate System Health Cost 
Loss of component 
function Component failure 
-Loss of power to 
GS transceivers, 
Mission Planner 
and monitor 
display 
-Loss of telemetry 
monitoring and 
capability to amend 
mission plan in flight 
Design 
-Redundancy of power supply from 
generator 
E IV IV Depleted capacity 
Exceed planned 
duration 
Insufficient Charge 
Loss connection 
Connector failure  
Loose connectors 
Overall E IV 
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2. Sensor Sub-system 
Component: GPS / Magnetic Compass 
Hazard Effect Mitigation Prob Severity Mode Causal factor Immediate System Health Cost 
Loss of GPS Link 
(Unable to be re-
established) 
Inadequate number 
of satellite signal  
-AP loses 
orientation 
-Uncontrolled flight 
heading and altitude. 
 
-Loss of autonomous 
capability, air vehicle 
is unable to proceed 
to way point 
Procedure 
-In autonomous mode, Pixhawk has a 
configurable GPS fail-safe logic that 
initiate circling at location when GPS signal 
is loss for more than 3 seconds. Return to 
launch site via dead reckoning will be 
initiated if loss in GPS link exceeds 20 sec 
 
Design 
-Switch to manual backup mode and land 
air vehicle via FPV 
D IV IV 
Loss of 
component 
function 
Component failure E IV IV 
Overall D IV 
 
Component: Pitot-static Sensor 
Hazard Effect Mitigation Prob Severity Mode Causal factor Immediate System Health Cost 
Leak in air tube Damage during installation/handling 
-Lower air 
pressure to sensor  
-Lower air speed 
perceived by AP. 
-Latent failure. Non observable unless sever 
leak resulted to perceived airspeed is lower 
than minimum airspeed limit.  
E IV IV 
Erratic air 
pressure data 
output 
Intermittent failure 
of sensor  
-Fluctuating air 
pressure from 
sensor  
-Fluctuating air speed 
perceived by AP. 
-Latent failure. Non observable unless 
fluctuation is significant and noticed by the 
ground operator. 
E IV IV 
Loss of 
component 
function 
Component failure -Loss of air pressure data 
-Loss of air speed 
data 
Procedure 
-Unverified effect in autonomous mode 
 
Design 
-Switch to manual backup mode and fly 
air vehicle back manually via FPV 
E IV IV 
Overall E IV 
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3. Transceiver Sub-system 
Component: Telemetry/command transceiver 
Hazard Effect Mitigation Prob Severity Mode Causal factor Immediate System Health Cost 
Loss of 
component 
function 
Component failure 
-Loss of telemetry 
data 
-Air vehicle 
performance cannot 
be monitored from 
the GS 
 
-New mission plan 
cannot be updated to 
the air vehicle 
Procedure 
-Pixhawk has a configurable GS fail-safe 
logic to initiate circling at location when 
telemetry link is lost for more than 1.5. A 
return to launch site will be initiated when 
loss of telemetry link exceeds 20 sec 
E IV IV 
Loss of 
transmission data 
Exceed transmission 
range 
Procedure 
-Geo-fence can be programmed into the AP 
computer to initiate a return to launch site 
when the air vehicle fly beyond the set 
boundary 
E IV IV 
Signal interference 
Design 
-Separate frequency spectrum between 
different transceiver in the UAS 
 
-Select modem with frequency hopping 
capability 
E IV IV 
Overall E IV 
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Component: RC transceiver 
Hazard Effect Mitigation Prob Severity Mode Causal factor Immediate System Health Cost 
Loss of 
component 
function 
Component failure 
-Loss RC 
communication 
link 
-Loss of backup 
manual capability by 
UAS  
Procedure 
-Pixhawk has a configurable Throttle fail-
safe logic to initiate circling at location 
when RC link is lost for more than 1.5 sec. 
If link lost exceeds 20 sec, a return to 
launch site will be enabled  
E IV IV 
Loss of 
transmission data 
Exceed transmission 
range 
Procedure 
-Geo-fence can be programmed into the AP 
computer to initiate a return to launch site 
when the air vehicle fly beyond the set 
boundary 
E IV IV 
Signal interference 
Design 
-Separate frequency spectrum between 
different transceiver in the UAS 
 
-Select modem with frequency hopping 
capability    
E IV IV 
Overall E IV 
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4. Servo Sub-system 
Component: Aileron 
Hazard Effect Mitigation Prob Severity Mode Causal factor Immediate System Health Cost 
Loss of 
component 
function 
Component failure -Loss of servo movement 
- Loss of rolling 
capability by air 
vehicle 
Procedure 
-Unverified effect in autonomous mode 
 
Design 
-Switch to manual backup mode and fly 
air vehicle back manually via FPV without 
affected servo 
E IV IV 
Erratic servo 
response 
Intermittent failure 
of servos  
-Servo does not 
respond according 
to input command 
- Chattering of 
control surface as AP 
constantly corrects 
for the servo 
deflection 
Design 
-Switch to manual backup mode and fly 
air vehicle back manually via FPV without 
affected servo 
E IV IV 
Overall E IV 
 
 
Component: Elevator 
Hazard Effect Mitigation Prob Severity Mode Causal factor Immediate System Health Cost 
Loss of 
component 
function 
Component failure -Loss of servo movement 
-Loss of pitching 
capability by air 
vehicle 
Design 
-Unverified effect in autonomous mode 
 
-Switch to manual backup mode and fly 
air vehicle back manually via FPV without 
affected servo 
E IV IV 
Erratic servo 
response 
Intermittent failure 
of servos  
-Servo does not 
respond according 
to input command 
- Chattering of 
control surface as AP 
constantly corrects 
for the servo 
deflection 
Design 
-Switch to manual backup mode and fly 
air vehicle back manually via FPV without 
affected servo 
E IV IV 
Overall E IV 
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Component: Rudder 
Hazard Effect Mitigation Prob Severity Mode Causal factor Immediate System Health Cost 
Loss of 
component 
function 
Component failure -Loss of servo movement 
-Loss of yawing 
capability by air 
vehicle 
Design 
-Unverified effect in autonomous mode 
 
-Switch to manual backup mode and fly 
air vehicle back manually via FPV without 
affected servo 
E IV IV 
Erratic servo 
response 
Intermittent failure 
of servos  
-Servo does not 
respond according 
to input command 
-Chattering of control 
surface as AP 
constantly corrects 
for the servo 
deflection 
Design 
-Switch to manual backup mode and fly 
air vehicle back manually via FPV without 
affected servo 
E IV IV 
Overall E IV 
 
Component: Flap 
Hazard Effect Mitigation Prob Severity Mode Causal factor Immediate System Health Cost 
Loss of 
component 
function 
Component failure -Loss of servo movement 
-Loss in additional 
lift and braking 
capability by air 
vehicle 
Design 
-Unverified effect in autonomous mode 
 
-Switch to manual backup mode and fly 
air vehicle back manually via FPV without 
affected servo 
E IV IV 
Erratic servo 
response 
Intermittent failure 
of servos  
-Servo does not 
respond according 
to input command 
- Chattering of 
control surface as AP 
constantly corrects 
for the servo 
deflection 
Design 
-Switch to manual backup mode and fly 
air vehicle back manually via FPV without 
affected servo 
E IV IV 
Overall E IV 
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5. Propulsion Sub-system 
Component: Motor 
Hazard Effect Mitigation Prob Severity Mode Causal factor Immediate System Health Cost 
Loss of 
component 
function 
Component failure -Loss of torque to propeller -Loss of lift to wings  
Design 
-Switch to manual backup mode for 
controlled non power manual landing via 
FPV 
E III IV 
Overall E III 
 
 
Component: Propeller 
Hazard Effect Mitigation Prob Severity Mode Causal factor Immediate System Health Cost 
Loss of 
component 
function 
Component failure 
-Loss of thrust 
from propeller -Loss of lift to wings  
Design 
-Switch to manual backup mode for 
controlled non power manual landing via 
FPV 
E III IV Mid air collision 
with birds 
Overall E III 
 
Severity for failure of motor or propeller is accorded as category III due to possible risk to personnel safety if unaware 
personnel did not get out of the landing path of the UAV. 
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6. Control Sub-system 
Component: Autopilot Computer 
Hazard Effect Mitigation Prob Severity Mode Causal factor Immediate System Health Cost 
Complete loss of 
component 
function (lose 
bypass logic to 
manual mode)  
Component failure 
-Loss of power to 
motor, servo and 
transceiver 
-Aircraft enters into 
an non-power and un-
controlled descend 
with servos fixed in 
the last position prior 
to loss of AP 
Procedure 
-Announce loss of control and  inform 
personnel to stay clear of the air vehicle’s 
descend path 
E III III 
Partial loss of 
component 
function 
(minimally retains 
bypass logic to 
manual mode and 
power supply to 
servo) 
-Loss of power to 
motor and 
transceiver 
-Loss of lift and 
telemetry link 
Design 
-Switch to manual backup mode for 
controlled non power manual landing via 
FPV 
 
-Separate power supply to payload 
subsystem to maintain FPV 
E IV IV 
Overall E III 
Severity for complete failure of AP computer is accorded as category III due to possible risk to personnel safety if unaware 
personnel did not get out of the landing path of the UAV. The severity to cost was also accorded as category III attributing to the 
potential cost of property damage that the air vehicle may crash into as there is no mean to control the directions during the gliding 
descend. 
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Component: ESC 
Hazard Effect Mitigation Prob Severity Mode Causal factor Immediate System Health Cost 
Loss of 
component 
function 
Component 
failure 
-Loss of power to 
motor 
-Aircraft enters into an 
non-power and un-
controlled descend 
Design 
-Switch to manual backup mode for 
controlled non power manual landing via FPV 
E III IV 
Erratic power 
supply 
Intermittent 
failure  
-ESC does not send 
correct power to 
motor 
-Fluctuating air speed 
resulting to fluctuating 
lift as AP constantly 
corrects for prescribed 
altitude 
Design 
-Switch to manual backup mode for 
controlled non power manual landing via FPV 
E IV IV 
Run away 
power supply 
ESC internal 
short circuit 
-Surge in power 
supply exceed motor 
rated limit and melts 
magnetic coil 
-Loss of motor resulting 
to loss of lift 
Design 
-Power module to limit maximum current 
to ESC 
E IV IV 
Overall E III 
Severity for complete failure of ESC is accorded as category III due to possible risk to personnel safety if unaware 
personnel did not get out of the landing path of the UAV. 
 
Component: BEC 
Hazard Effect Mitigation Prob Severity Mode Causal factor Immediate System Health Cost 
Loss of 
component 
function 
Component 
failure 
-Loss of power to 
AP computer 
-Aircraft enters into an 
non-power and un-
controlled descend with 
servos fixed in the last 
position prior to loss of AP 
Design 
-Dual power supply to AP computer E IV IV 
Overall E IV 
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Component: Mission Planning Software 
Hazard Effect Mitigation Prob Severity Mode Causal factor Immediate System Health Cost 
Loss of 
component 
function 
Component failure 
-Loss of mission 
planning 
capability,  
telemetry 
-Loss of mission 
planning capability 
and  telemetry 
display at GS 
Procedure 
-Program switch to initiate return to 
launch site on manual RC controller 
 
E IV IV 
Overall E IV 
 
Component: Manual RC Controller 
Hazard Effect Mitigation Prob Severity Mode Causal factor Immediate System Health Cost 
Loss of 
component 
function 
Component failure -Manual backup mode  
-No effect in 
autonomous mode 
Procedure 
-Initiate return to launch site in 
autonomous mode  
E IV IV 
Overall E IV 
 
Component: Laptop 
Hazard Effect Mitigation Prob Severity Mode Causal factor Immediate System Health Cost 
Loss of 
component 
function 
Component failure 
-Loss of mission 
planning 
capability,  
telemetry and 
image display at 
GS 
-Loss of mission 
planning capability,  
telemetry and image 
display at GS 
Design 
-Switch to manual backup mode for 
controlled non power manual landing via 
FPV 
 
-Separate monitor to display FPV image 
 
-OSD to provide telemetry display on 
FPV image 
E IV IV 
Overall E IV 
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Appendix B: Setup for Pixhawk Autopilot Computer (ArduPilot, nd) 
 Several features and fail-safe functions on the “Pixhawk Autopilot” were utilized 
to mitigate the risks identified in the FMECA. The fail-safes applied were 1) Throttle 
Fail-Safe, 2) GS Fail-Safe, 3) Battery Fail-Safe and 4) GPS Fail-Safe. Features of 
“Pixhawk Autopilot” employed in the architecture include geo-fence and dual power 
capability.  
The fail-safes were invoked by setting the necessary parameters in the 
configuration through the “Mission Planner”. Configuration setting of the fail-safe is 
carried out in the “Advance Params” function found under “Configuration” in the toolbar. 
It is to note that different versioning of the “Mission Planner” has different Graphic User 
Interface. In this research, “Mission Planner” version 1.3.24 was used.  
1. Fail-Safe Action 
 The various types of fail-safe mention above will conclude into different 
predefined actions after it has been triggered. The actions for the individual fail-safe 
differs from each other, some only have a single action, while others may have a series of 
actions depending on how the parameters are configured.  
Fail-safes that have a series of action have two modes of responses. These are 
configured into the “Pixhawk Autopilot” as “FS_SHORT_ACTN” (Short Fail-Safe 
Response) and “FS_LONG_ACTN” (Long Fail-Safe Response).  Each mode of response 
will maintain a duration based on the value specified in “FS_SHORT_TIMEOUT” and 
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“FS_LONG_TIMEOUT” before concluding its predefined action. The table below 
summaries the description of the two modes of responses used in the architecture. 
Table 22: Summary of Fail-Safe Response 
Mode Parameter Name Value Action Description 
Short Fail-Safe 
Response 
FS_SHORT_TIMEOUT “1.5” 
-Duration of failure associated with mode of fail-
safe before “Short Fail-Safe Response” is initiated. 
-Default 1.5 second is used for the architecture 
FS_SHORT_ACTN 
“0” Nil (Disabled) 
“1” Circle in current location 
“2” Glide Landing with zero throttle setting and servo deflection 
Long Fail-Safe 
Response 
FS_LONG_TIMEOUT “20” 
-Duration of failure associated with mode of fail-
safe before “Long Fail-Safe Response” is initiated. 
-Default 20 second is reduced for the architecture 
FS_LONG-ACTN 
“0” Nil (Disabled) 
“1” Return to launch location 
“2” Glide Landing with zero throttle setting and servo deflection 
 
2. Throttle Fail-Safe 
 Throttle input controls the rotational speed of the electrical motor which in turn 
determines the amount of thrust generated by the propeller. This input is sent from the 
RC console to the onboard AP computer as a Pulse Width Modulation (PWM) signal 
where higher throttle input relates to higher PWM frequency. On board the air vehicle, 
the AP computer interprets the PWM frequency and translates it into corresponding 
current amperage for the motor. 
Throttle Fail-Safe is activated when the received PWM frequency by the AP 
computer is lower than the predefined frequency at the minimum throttle input. This 
situation occurs when there is a component failure in the RC subsystem or when the air 
vehicle exceeded the transmission range of the RC transceivers. It is to note that the RC 
controller will generate an audio warning when the received signal strength reached the 
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preset low threshold as the air vehicle operates near its maximum transmission range or 
in the presence of interference. 
Throttle fail-Safe is enabled when the “THR_FAILSAFE” parameter is set as “1” 
and is triggered when the PWM frequency drops below the “THR_FS_VALUE” 
parameter. The value input for the “THR_FS_VALUE” parameter must be lower than the 
frequency when the throttle is at the minimum position. For the “Taranis” RC controller 
used in this research, the associated “THR_FS_VALUE” value is set below 925.   
 The fail-safe action will depend on how the two modes of response are 
configured; see previous section on Fail Safe Action. Depending on the configured 
parameter, “FS_SHORT_ACTN’ (Short Fail-Safe Response) will be invoked when the 
duration of the associated fault exceeds the value for “FS_SHORT_TIMEOUT”. As the 
fault persists beyond the value set for “FS_LONG_TIMEOUT”, the “FS_LONG_ACTN’ 
(Long Fail-Safe Response) will be initiated. See Figure 33 for the sequence of the 
Throttle Fail-Safe Response. 
The contingency procedure mentioned Figure 33 is to initiate “Autonomous 
mode” through the GS and input a command to launch return the UAV back to the launch 
site. With a loss in function of the RC console, the safety pilot cannot land the UAV 
manually. This will be replaced by an autonomous landing that is activated through the 
GS. 
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Figure 33: Sequence of Throttle Fail-Safe Response 
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3. GS Fail-Safe 
 Telemetry protocol message is continuously transmitted from the GS to the air 
vehicle. The AP computer will interpret a loss of communication link with the GS if there 
is protocol message is not received. When the value of “FS_GCS_ENABLE” parameter 
is set to “1”, GS Fail-Safe is enabled. The response of the GS Fail-safe is similar to the 
Throttle Fail-safe and will depend on the Fail-safe action defined in Section 1 of this 
appendix. However, the contingency procedure for the GS Fail-safe is different from the 
Throttle Fail-safe. For GS Fail-safe, the Safety pilot will select “Manual mode” or 
“Stabilized mode” from the RC console and land the aircraft manually.   
4. Battery Fail-Safe 
 Battery Fail-Safe triggers a return to launch site when the voltage or current drops 
below the values specified in the parameter configuration for the main power bus to the 
AP computer. The parameters associated with this function are “FS_BATT_VOLTAGE” 
and “FS_BATT_MAH” with default values set as “0” which disable the fail-safes. 
Changing the parameter to the desired values will enable the fail-safe function. The unit 
of measure associated with “FS_BATT_VOLTAGE” is in volt and “FS_BATT_MAH” is 
in mAH. 
5. GPS Fail-Safe 
 GPS Fail-Safe can only be set up after enabling the Advance Fail Safe function of 
the “Pixhawk autopilot”. The Advance Fail Safe is enabled by setting the 
“AFS_ENABLE” parameter to ‘1’. The GPS fail safe will be triggered if GPS lock is loss 
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for more than 3 seconds and will return to the waypoint number that was specified in the 
“AFS_WP_GPS_LOSS” parameter. For example, when the parameter is set to ‘5’ the 
UAV will return to the number 5 waypoint that was set in the mission plan.  
Thereafter, the UAV will loiter above the way point. If GPS link is restored, the 
UAV will resume its mission. However if the GPS link is not restored after 30 second, 
the AP computer will stop the mission and return the UAV to the launch site.  
It is to note that the GPS Fail-safe has an association with GS Fail-safe. In the 
event that GS link with the UAV is loss together with the GPS link, the AP computer will 
terminate the operation by setting the throttle to zero and deflects all control surface to 
maximum. This will result to the UAV spiraling to the ground.   
6. Geo-fencing 
There are two modes of activation for the Geo-fence. The first mode is via a RC 
channel input with a PWM value above 1,750. This PWM signal must be maintain 
throughout the entire duration when the fence is activated. The second mode of activation 
is via the parameter “FENCE_AUTOENABLE”. When set to the value of ‘1’, the Geo-
fence will be automatically enabled after an autonomous take-off.  
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Appendix C: Source Reference for Components in Architecture 
Battery Sizing 
Preliminary sizing of the battery for a system endurance of 0.5 hr was conducted to 
allocate suitable costing for the various power supplies for the sub-systems. The ‘Usable 
Energy’ of a battery will depend on the ‘Battery Efficiency’ and ‘Usable Factor’ which 
are typically 0.8 (Gundlach, 1975:72). 
 
Energy battery = Capacity * Voltage * n battery * f usable (8) 
 
Payload Battery 
Table 23: Calculated Payload Battery Consumption  
Component Voltage (V) Current (mA) Power Required = Voltage * Current (mW) 
Transmitter 3.7 – 5 500 2,500 
Camera 5 - 12 700 8,400 
OSD 5 500 2,500 
Total 13,400 mW 
 
 
Battery usable = Capacity * n battery * f usable (9) 
= 1,300 * 0.8 * 0.8  
= 832 mAhr  
  
From Equation (8), the usable battery capacity is derived to give Equation (9). A 3 
cell Lithium Polymer (LiPo) battery with output voltage of 11.1 V and capacity of 1,300 
mAhr was selected. From Equation (9), the battery ‘Usable Capacity’ is derived at 832 
mAhr. The total capacity current required by the payload sub-system from the battery is 
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1,207 mA ( 13,400 W
11.1 V
 ). Hence, with 832 mAh ‘Usable Capacity’, the endurance for the 
Payload sub-system is 0.69 hr. 
Motor Battery 
The capacity of the primary battery is determined by numerous factors. These 
include duration of the mission, motor size, flight profile of the UAV, take-off weight, 
transceiver transmission power and wind condition. From earlier research efforts, four 6 
cell batteries were arranged in parallel, each with a pair of battery in series was used to 
power the “SIG rascal 110”. Each battery is 22.2 V and carries a capacity of 5,000 mA. 
A 20 minutes flight was achieved with 10,000 mA at 44.4 V at the end of the test. 
However, the specific utilization rate was not documented. The same battery 
configuration was retained but in the new architecture, it is only powering the motor and 
not the entire UAV. From Chapter 5, the average consumption rate for the motor bus was 
10,982 mA per hour. The selected battery configuration is expected to have an excess of 
45% capacity to support a 0.5 hr flight. Factoring for battery usable capacity, the 
configuration would still have an excess of 9% capacity after a 0.5 hr flight. 
Avionics Battery  
The avionics battery supplies power the AP computer, which in turn powers the 
servos, transceivers and GPS. In the event of a loss in propulsion, the operator will switch 
to ‘Manual Mode’ and glide the UAV to a clear location for landing. The current 
consumption of the avionics is relatively small compared to the motor. To reduce 
diversity in parts, the same 3 cell LiPo battery (11.1 V, 1,300 mAhr) selected for the 
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payload sub-system were used to power the avionics system. Similar to the motor battery, 
the utilization rate will be measured in Chapter 5 to verify adequacy of the capacity.
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Table 24: Source Reference for Components in Architecture  
S/N Description Reference website 
1 Sig Rascal 110 http://www.sigplanes.com/SIG-Rascal-110-EG-ARF_p_232.html 
2 Servo comes with air vehicle 
3 Motor (HimaxHC6332-230 
Brushless Electric Motor) 
http://www.sigplanes.com/SIG-Rascal-110-EG-ARF_p_232.html 
4 Propeller (APC 19x10E) http://www.sigplanes.com/SIG-Rascal-110-EG-ARF_p_232.html 
5 Anti Spark (50 Ohm resistor) Consumable hardware - negligible cost 
6 Arming Switch http://www.sigplanes.com/SIG-Rascal-110-EG-ARF_p_232.html 
7 ESC (120 A) http://www.castlecreations.com/products/phoenix-edge-lite-hv.html 
8 PM (45 V) http://www.hobbyking.com/hobbyking/store/__56855__HKPilot_Mega_10s_Power_Module_With_X
T60_Connectors.html 
9 Pixhawk Autopilot computer https://store.3drobotics.com/products/3dr-
pixhawk/?utm_source=google&utm_medium=cpc&utm_term=branded&utm_campaign=branded&gcl
id=CPWikYGcuMYCFVU6gQodTpkJUg 
10 Telemetry Transmitter (RFD 
900+ modem) 
http://store.jdrones.com/RDF900_Telemetry_Modem_p/rdf900mdm1.htm 
11 Telemetry Antenna 
(900MHz) 
https://store.3drobotics.com/products/antenna-900mhz-rp-sma-2dbi?taxon_id=34 
12 RC Transceiver (2.4 GHz) http://www.multiwiicopter.com/products/frsky-l9r-long-range-taranis-rx 
13 Video transmitter (Aomway 
5.8 GHz TX 1000) 
http://www.fpvmodel.com/aomway-5-8g-1000mw-a-v-1w-transmitter-5-8g-32ch-receiver-built-in-
dvr-for-fpv_g602.html 
14 BEC https://store.3drobotics.com/products/apm-power-module-with-xt60-connectors?taxon_id=34 
15 Diode Consumable hardware - negligible cost 
16 GPS/Magnetic Compass https://store.3drobotics.com/products/3dr-gps-ublox-with-compass 
17 Pitot-static Sensor https://store.3drobotics.com/products/pixhawk-airspeed-sensor-kit?taxon_id=34 
18 OSD http://www.hobbyking.com/hobbyking/store/__80102__Minim_OSD_for_APM_or_Pixhawk_Flight_
Controllers.html 
19 Camera (Hack HD camera 
PCB) 
http://hackhd.com/ 
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S/N Description Reference website 
20 Voltage regulator (5 V) http://www.hobbyking.com/hobbyking/store/__41922__Blue_Arrow_Ultra_Micro_Automatic_Voltag
e_Regulator_5V_1A_DC_Output.html 
21 Battery (Motor - 6 cell 
5,000mAh ) 
http://www.hobbyking.com/hobbyking/store/__9176__Turnigy_5000mAh_6S_20C_Lipo_Pack.html  
22 Battery (Avionics - 3 cell 
1,300mAh) 
http://www.hobbyking.com/hobbyking/store/__11903__Turnigy_nano_tech_1300mah_3S_25_50C_L
ipo_Pack.html 
23 Battery (Payload - 3 cell 1,300mAh) http://www.hobbyking.com/hobbyking/store/__11903__Turnigy_nano_tech_1300mah_3S_25_50C_L
ipo_Pack.html 
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